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AN ISSUE-DRIVEN STRATEGY FOR 
REVIEW OF AGENCY DECISIONSt 
Charles H. Koch, Jr.* 
Justice Scalia, the first administrative law scholar to sit on the Supreme Court since Felix Frankfurter, began his dissent in NLRB v. Curtin Mathe-
son Scientific, Inc.: "The Court makes heavy weather out of what is, under 
well-established principles of administrative law, a straightforward case." 1 
That observation should give any administrative law specialist pause because 
courts, including the Supreme Court, and advocates regularly cast about in 
a fog of ignorance where the light of "well-established principles of admin-
istrative law" is readily available. 2 Sure enough, this case could be resolved 
by the application of the principles governing the scope of review of admin-
istrative action. These principles have existed for generations. Indeed, justice 
Frankfurter, in the famous Universal Camera 3 opinion involving the very 
same agency, found those principles to be well established more than forty 
years ago and incorporated by reference through the Federal Administra-
tive Procedure Act (F APA). 
Yet there is evidence that Justice Scalia has overstated the case in this 
instance. He dissented from a majority opinion confirming the judgment 
t Copyright© 1990 by Charles H. Koch, Jr. 
*Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of 
Law: LL.M. 1975, University of Chicago; J.D. 1969, George Washington University; B.A. 
1966, University of Maryland. I would like to acknowledge the generous assistance of Peter 
Strauss and Paul Verkuil. 
I. 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1557 (1990) (Scalia,]., dissenting). 
2. This seems a propitious opportunity to mention that my two-volume treatise on admin-
istrative law has a good deal about "well-established administrative law principles." 2 C. KocH, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE (1985) [hereinafter KOCH and the 1990 supplement 
KocH SuPP]. I apologize in advance for citing myself but, at least, I have tried to use it for 
further discussion rather than in support of myself. 
Also appearing frequently: 
Breyer,judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986). 
Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Ill, I 0 I HARV. L.. REV. 915 
(1988). 
Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 CEO. L.J. I (1985). 
McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy 
Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 CEO. L.J. 729 (1979). 
Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706. [hereinafter FAPA]. 
Uniform Law Commissioners' Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1981) [here-
inafter MSAPA]. 
3. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). 
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of a Fifth Circuit judge, Jerre Williams, whose administrative law creden-
tials are impeccable.4 What can explain this fundamental disagreement 
between these two administrative law experts? The answer lies in the fact 
that, while there are undoubtedly relevant well-established principles, they 
are not equal to the task. The law governing the extent of review of admin-
istrative decisions simply fails in complex cases. This article explores the 
reasons for the failures of the current principles and suggests formalization 
of principles that have been evolving through cases such as Curtin Matheson 
in which the well-established principles prove insufficient. 5 
Justice Scalia accused the majority of ignoring well-established principles 
but, in fact, the majority followed well-established, if not formalized, judi-
cial practice. When faced with a complex review assignment, sophisticated 
courts usually construct an issue-driven review strategy that transcends the 
simplistic system contemplated by formalistic administrative law and incor-
porated in the F APA. This issue-driven strategy allows the courts to define 
their role both more flexibly and with more precision and hence enables 
them to meet the needs of the complex modern relationship between the 
judiciary and the bureaucracy.6 
The strategy recognizes that any given administrative decision incorpo-
rates the resolution of a bundle of issues. Because of the variety of substan-
tive areas dominated by the administrative process, a fundamental strategy 
based on particular substantive questions would be impossible. Instead, the 
law has evolved a strategy towards a few basic, and accepted, categories of 
issues: policy, fact, law, procedure, and discretion. 
4. The majority reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit in Curtin Matheson Scientific, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1988), to which Judge Williams dissented. Among 
other credentials, Judge Williams was an administrative law scholar at Texas and the first 
chair of the Administrative Conference of the United States. 
5. Levin, supra note 2, at I ("Scope-of-review ... has always been one of the principal 
whipping boys of administrative law."). 
6. In its formative years, the administrative process was expected to overcome the defects 
discovered in the three constitutional branches. James Landis, its strongest advocate, argued: 
The administrative process is, in essence, our generation's answer to the inadequacy of the 
judicial and the legislative processes. It represents our effort to find an answer to those 
inadequacies by some other method than merely increasing executive power. If the doctrine 
of the separation of power implies division, it also implies balance, and balance calls for 
equality. The creation of administrative power may be the means for the preservation of 
that balance, so that paradoxically enough, though it may seem in theoretic violation of 
the doctrine of the separation of power, it may in matter of fact be the means for the 
preservation of the content of that doctrine. 
j. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 46 (1938). 
In modern times, however, we see the defects in the administrative process as well and, 
hence our search for shared power is more practical than theoretical. E.g., Strauss, The Place 
of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 
( 1984); Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish 
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987); Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies 
After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779. 
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I. THE PARADIGM 
Curtin Matheson provides a useful vehicle for exploring the issue-driven 
strategy because at least one of its opinions confronts each issue category. 7 
Each opinion, even Justice Scalia's, pursues an issue-driven strategy. More-
over they do so in a context administrative law theory would contend should 
be easy: formal adjudication by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). 
The Supreme Court reviewed the NLRB's decision that Curtin Matheson 
committed an unfair labor practice by discontinuing its recognition of a 
Teamsters local. 8 The union had been the collective-bargaining agent until 
a strike in 1979. During the strike, the company hired a number of replace-
ment workers and several employees returned to work. The company 
contended that it had a good faith belief that the union no longer repre-
sented the employees and therefore refused the union's settlement offer. 
The union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. 9 
An administrative law judge (ALJ) dismissed the charges but the Board 
reversed and held that the company lacked a sufficient objective basis to 
question the union's support. 10 In doing so, the Board continued the proc-
ess of reversing a long-standing "rule" that allowed employers to presume 
that replacement workers would not support the union. 11 Instead, the Board 
adopted a case-by-case approach in which the employer would be required 
to provide evidence that the union lacked the support of the replacement 
employees. 12 The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order and 
rejected the Board's decision not to accept any presumptions about the views 
of replacement employees. 13 The Supreme Court took the case to resolve 
a split in the circuits. 
Justice Marshall, writing for three other Justices and the Court, reversed the 
Fifth Circuit and upheld the NLRB. His review strategy was based on his find-
ing that the Board, rather than the courts, was primarily responsible for labor 
policy. 14 Courts then are required to uphold the agency's policy decision if "it 
is rational and consistent with the Act." 15 Justice Marshall found that the Board's 
change of policy was based on its long experience and was not irrational. Also, 
the NLRB's decision was consistent with the "overriding policy" of "industrial 
peace." 16 Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred but observed that the NLRB's 
7. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. I542 (1990). 
8. /d. 
9. /d. at I547. 
IO. /d. 
II. See, e.g., Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (I987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 
1989). 
12. II 0 S. Ct. at 1548. 
13. /d. 
14. /d. at 1549. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. at 1553. 
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new rule "press[es] to the limit the deference to which the Board is entitled 
in assessing industrial reality." 17 
Justice Scalia wrote the primary dissenting opinion, with Justice Black-
mun making some separate observations. 18 Justice Scalia, as evidenced by 
the quote introducing this article, tried to contend that the judicial role was 
well established and that the majority had not performed its well-defined 
role. Superficially, Justice Scalia followed his contention that the case merely 
required the application of the well-established word formula review stan-
dard of "substantial evidence." 19 One understanding of that test requires 
"more than a scintilla" and Justice Scalia found "not a shred of affirmative 
evidence" to support the NLRB. 20 The more widely used understanding 
looks for reasonableness. 21 Justice Scalia concluded: "On those facts, any 
reasonable fact finder must conclude that the respondent possessed, not 
necessarily a certainty, but at least a reasonable, good-faith doubt, that the 
union did not have majority support. " 22 
Justice Marshall and Justice Scalia disagreed largely because they disa-
greed as to the kinds of issues under review. Justice Marshall found the 
crucial issues to be ones of policy and reviewed them according to the judi-
cial role with respect to policymaking. He also held that the Board "acted 
within its discretion" and its decision was "consistent with the Act."23 Justice 
Scalia believed the crucial issues to be ones of fact and proceeded to review 
the Board's determination according to the judicial role with respect to fact-
finding.24 In his separate dissent, Justice Blackmun raised questions about 
the adequacy of the procedures. 25 In play then were all the major issue 
categories: policy, fact, law, procedure, and discretion. From this base, we 
can explore how these judges, and others, defined their role according to 
types of issues and the advantages of doing so. 
II. REVIEW OF POLICY 
Justice Marshall and the Court reviewed ·the Board's judgment "as a 
matter of policy. " 26 Judge Williams also found himself guided by his finding 
that policymaking was at issue: 
The simple phrase "substantial evidence," however, does not completely describe 
the standard of review in this particular case where we consider not only the 
Board's factual conclusions but also its evolving policy .... 
17. /d. at 1554 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
18. /d. at 1555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
19. /d. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
20. /d. at 1560 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
21. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at § 9.4. 
22. II 0 S. Ct. at 1560 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
23. /d. at 1553-54. 
24. /d. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
25. /d. at 1556 (Biackmun, J., dissenting). 
26. See id. at 1546. 
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A great degree of deference is owed to the Board's policy choices ... Y 
As recognized by Judge Williams and the majority of the Supreme Court, 
there are well-established administrative law principles that define review 
of administrative policymaking. His protest to the contrary, Justice Scalia 
was compelled himself to recognize and treat separately the policymaking 
elements in the Board's decisions. What should the review strategy be if the 
validity of the decision does depend on policy issues? 
Although modern government is expected to provide a variety of serv-
ices, the fundamental purpose of government is to further general societal 
goals. 28 Government decisions aimed at advancing or protecting collective 
goals of the community is policymaking. 29 The agency exercises its policy-
making authority when it, rather than some other authority, properly makes 
these collective decisions. 30 Of course such decisions may be based on fact-
finding31 but they are not factual.:12 As has often been observed, in our 
complicated society the legislative branch cannot perform all or perhaps 
even a major part of this function. 33 Thus, agencies often receive major 
policym·aking functions. 34 
Generally agencies dominate the resolution of policy issues. Theoreti-
cally, the political authority retains control; the courts traditionally acquire 
27. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1988) (Williams, 
J., dissenting). 
28. "The ultimate test of the administrative is the policy that it formulates; not the fairness 
as between the parties of the disposition of a controversy on a record of their own making .. , 
J. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 39. 
29. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057, 1058-59 (1975) reprinted in R. 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81 (1977). Policy decisions are based on aggregate 
values; they do not focus on individual goals or on the resolution of individual situations. 
Obviously, the two are somewhat interrelated but it is possible to separate those decisions 
that reflect general or societal goals from other types of decisions. See generally id. at 1067-
70 (types of rights). 
30. Thus distinguishing such decisions from decisions about law. See infra notes 139-40 
and accompanying text. 
31. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of review of general 
facts. 
32. Arr'y GEN. COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REP. 117 (1941) jhere-
inafter FINAL REP.]. 
33. See generally Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 
I J .L. ECON. & ORG. 81 ( 1985). But see Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court 
Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985). 
34. G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 29-30 (2d 
ed. 1980) ("[o]ne of the original justifications for agencies [is] the development of policy."); 
Tomain, Institutionalized Conflicts Between Law and Policy, 22 Hous. L. REV. 661, 663 (1985). 
See also R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 364 
(1985) ("It is often impossible for an agency or a reviewing court to discern from the language 
of a statute or it. legislative history how Congress intended an agency to resolve policy issues 
inherent in scient •. ;c uncertainty."); Levin, supra note 2, at 22 ("But the agency is expected 
tt'l use its own creativity in determining what weight to attach to these various factors under 
the circumstances of the particular regulatory program. In doing so, the agency is not inter-
preting the legislative will but, instead, responding to a legislative invitation to make law. This 
aspect of the administrative decision, therefore, does not support independent review by the 
court.") (emphasis in original). 
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only a limited role. Thus, policymaking is in reality left to the bureaucracy. 
As Justice Marshall observed: "This Court has emphasized often that the 
NLRB has the primary responsibility for developing and applying national 
labor policy."35 The same could be said of nearly every agency acting within 
its own substantive area. For this reason, as judge Williams concluded: "A 
great degree of deference is owed to the Board's policy choices . .' .. " 36 
Several reasons exist to continue this special restraint in the issue-driven 
strategy. 
Policymaking implicates all the aspects of expertise. Administrative agen-
cies, as all of the opinions in Curtin Matheson recognize, have a special claim 
on expertise. Foremost, tasks are assigned to the administrative process 
rather than the courts because agencies embody special expertise. Thus an 
agency's policymaking expertise constitutes a conscious allocation of func-
tions cautioning the courts against undue interference. 
In addition to systemic justification for restraint are operational justifi-
cations. Generally expertise includes superior capacity for compiling the 
information in support of policymaking. Experts identify necessary infor-
mation and understand how to synthesize the information. Even if judges 
have the capacity to accumulate and evaluate specialized information, they 
cannot make expert use of that information in the same way as an expert 
administrative officiaiY When the legislature has made the choice to rely 
on expert judgments, the generalist courts should meticulously avoid 
circumventing the legislative choice. 38 Thus when policymaking is assigned 
to the administrative process, courts must assure that this assignment has 
meaning. 39 
Another reason for choosing the administrative process is the availability 
of superior and diverse procedures. Judicial procedures are designed to 
resolve individual controversies and hence judges confront policy choices 
only in narrow and biased contexts. On the other hand, administrative 
procedures can be designed to compile the information and views necessary 
for uniform decisions. 
The judicial process has nothing equivalent to the administrative rule-
making processes. Using traditional rulemaking procedures, an agency must 
give public notice of its regulatory plans and offer some opportunity to 
comment, often orally as well as in writing. 40 Rulemaking allows adminis-
trative policymakers to seek out information and comments in a way that 
judges cannot. Also, rulemaking engages both technical experts and polit-
ical decisionmakers directly in the decision. Although a trial may permit 
35. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990). 
36. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1988) (Williams, 
J., dissenting). 
37. See generally McGarity, supra note 2 (science policy questions). 
38. See Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 
456,499. 
39. Fallon, supra note 2, at 935-36. 
40. I KOCH, supra note 2, at ch. 4. 
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testimony from experts and even political actors, a judge cannot involve 
such people in the actual decisionmaking. At the appellate level, where most 
policy questions might be resolved, the competence of the judicial process 
is more questionable. Indeed, much of Justice Scalia's concern relates to 
administrative law's grudging acceptance of the NLRB's failure to use rule-
making, that is, the process specifically designed for sweeping fact-finding 
and broad participation, when making policy. 
True, the NLRB in the case reviewed in Curtin Matheson made policy 
through trial-like or "formal" adjudication and thus chose a process with 
many of the policymaking defects of a trial. 41 Administrative adjudication, 
however, has the flexibility to be a policymaking vehicle superior to a judi-
cial proceeding. Even in adjudication, an agency can and often does provide 
for broader intervention than judges in a judicial proceeding. 42 An agency 
may seek out a broad range of comments in adjudication when it finds the 
need to engage in policymaking in such proceedings. Indeed, the NLRB 
has used this method quite successfully. 43 Judges find it much more difficult 
to obtain expert assistance. They hear only conflicting testimony from 
experts chosen by the parties; they may not use experts to help them with 
the decision making. 44 In reality the judicial process is designed to prevent 
open communication between judges and experts. The attributes of a 
generalist merge with ignorance to substantially impede informed policy-
making. Agency adjudicators, often themselves quite expert, can compel 
the appearance of experts to help and have experts available to assist in the 
decisionmaking itself. 
New policy affects those engaging in the practice at the time the policy 
becomes effective. Not only is the judicial process incapable of seeking broad 
participation, denying participation to those affected, but it makes policy 
in the case at hand. Thus the parties are affected by policy decisions nonex-
istent at the time they engaged in the practice. The Supreme Court has 
objected to the retroactive application of administrative rules45 but it regu-
larly engages in retroactive policymaking. Indeed, it can act no other way. 
Agencies, however, can make prospective policy,46 and hence, administra-
tive policymaking is likely to be more fair than judicial policymaking. When 
agencies act prospectively, the courts should be very reluctant to substitute 
41. As Justice Scalia observed, N LRB adjudications are "even more judicialized than ordi-
nary formal adjudication .... " NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 
1558 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
42. See Gardner, Federal Courts and Agencies: An Audit of the Partnership Books, 75 CoLUM. 
L. REV. 800 (1975). 
43. For example, the administrative case at issue in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 
U.S. 759 (1969), was the famous Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), where 
the NLRB used adjudication to make a "rule" but, in the course of doing so, it did solicit 
participation from nonparties who would be affected. 394 U.S. at 763. 
44. But see Fed. R. Evid. 706. 
45. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
46. I KocH, supra note 2, at § 6.58 (agency can act prospectively in adjudication as well 
as rulemaking). [But the judiciary may make prospective decisions also, see id.J 
518 43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 511 
their reactive policymaking. Justice Scalia's concluding objection is to the 
Board's making policy in the guise of fact-findingY At least the Board had 
a choice; judges must make policy in the guise of deciding a specific case. 
Perhaps the major factor counseling judicial restraint in reviewing poli-
cymaking is uncertainty. A policy choice is made necessarily under condi-
tions of uncertainty, sometimes extreme uncertainty. Policymaking is by 
nature prospective and incorporates some judgments about the future, about 
the impact on human behavior, and other intangible factors. Because of 
this uncertainty, we tend to evaluate the "wisdom" of a particular policy 
rather than its support. Not only did the legislature ordain that the agency's 
judgment respecting these uncertain conditions should be dominant, but 
the agency was structured to make such choices. If various aspects of exper-
tise are merged with political consideration, then the agency structure will 
reflect this mixture in a way that courts will not. 
The danger of this uncertainty is that courts can justify extreme inter-
ference. The agency has difficulty proving the correctness of its policy 
choices and hence such choices are always open to criticism.48 A court that 
wishes to arrogate power can use this opening to do so. Thus it is essential 
that courts allow agencies policymaking freedom and not require more 
support and justification than is possible under the particular conditions of 
uncertainty.49 When an agency undertakes policymaking assigned to it, the 
courts should avoid becoming too deeply involved because of its inherent 
disadvantages in expertise, process, and considering uncertainty. 50 A court 
must discontinue its evaluation of policy choices at the point at which it 
concludes that the agency has undertaken careful and complete 
decisionmaking. 51 
47. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1566 (1990) (Scalia,]., 
dissenting). 
48. Breyer observed: 
Given the uncertainties and complexities ... , it may appear perfectly reasonable to an 
engineer to rest a decision ... on an inspired guess. That same decision might appear 
irrational to a judge to whom the parties have explained how much time, effort, and money 
that inspired guess will cost them. Judges may not fully appreciate the agency's need to 
make decisions under conditions of uncertainty. 
S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 117 (I 982). 
49. McGarity, supra note 2, at 809 ("Because an agency need not act with the same degree 
of certainty that characterizes pure scientific investigation, courts engaged in substantive 
review of agency decisions on science policy questions should never demand such certainty."). 
50. Breyer expressed "nagging doubts" that the courts improve policymaking. Breyer, 
supra note 2, at 395; see also Fallon, supra note 2, at 920. 
51. Nonetheless, this can be a rather hefty review as noted by Diver: 
Reviewing courts have insisted that agencies probe the implications of their policy choices. 
Not only must administrators attend to consequences suggested by public comment; courts 
will also frequently require them to seek out and analyze other possible consequences of 
their actions. Although most courts do not demand explicit quantification unless the stat-
ute so requires, several have nonetheless called for a qualitative comparison of good and 
bad consequences. Even if the courts have not universally endorsed specific analytic tech-
niques, they have typically demanded a thorough and expansive approach .... 
Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393, 417-18 (1981) 
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Ill. THE RELEVANCE OF THE PROCESS 
In Curtin Matheson, 52 neither Justice Marshall nor Justice Scalia was suffi-
ciently careful in dealing with the implications of NLRB's method of 
proceeding. The controversial administrative decision was not so much the 
case at hand but the policy made by the Board in a prior adjudication, 
Station KKH/. 53 Justice Marshall referred to this as a "rule" for which the 
very limited arbitrariness review standard should be applied. 54 Justice Scalia 
noted that the Board made this policy through formal adjudication for which 
the more severe substantial evidence or reasonableness standard is appro-
priate.55 To what extent should the method used to make policy affect the 
kind and level of review? 
To understand this conflict, it is necessary to confront another review 
strategy: the word formula system. This system relies on certain phrases to 
communicate the desired level of review. Although several phrases have 
been used over the years, three have become established for those agency 
decisions which are reviewable. The three word formulas are "de novo," 
"substantial evidence," and "arbitrary or capricious."56 Although these 
phrases lack concrete definition, they have meaning in terms of relative 
severity of judicial scrutiny .57 I have attempted to define them in terms of 
tolerance for risk of error. 58 Except in the most rigorous system, even 
correctness must be viewed in terms of acceptable risk of error. 59 Thus, a 
court applying the most demanding word formula, usually called de novo 
(what I call agreement review), asks whether in its judgment the agency's 
solution has the least risk of error as among all competing solutions.fi° From 
this word formula, the other two standards each express a descending scru-
tiny for error. In this system, a court operating under the de novo standard 
is to tolerate less risk of error than one operating under the substantial 
(footnotes omitted). 
Although Judge Leventhal's hard look doctrine might be applied to a variety of issues, it 
seems well suited to policymaking. See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 
Sur. CT. REV. 177, 181; see also Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and 
Administrative Law, 7 HARV.j.L. & PUB. POL'Y 51,53-54 (1984). 
52. IJOS.Ct.l542(1990). 
53. 284 N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enforced, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989). 
54. 110 S. Ct. at 1549. 
55. /d. at 1558 (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
56. 2 KocH and 2 KocH SUPP., supra note 2, at § 9.6. 
57. A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford grounds for certi-
tude but cannot assure certainty of application. Some scope for judicial discretion in 
applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judging or 
by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry .... But a standard leaving an 
unavoidable margin for individual judgment does not leave the judicial judgment at large 
even though the phrasing of the standard does not wholly fence it in. 
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,488-89 (1951). 
58. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at§§ 9.3-9.7. 
59. E.g., J. PETERSON, THE MATHEMATICAL TOURIST, 31, 107 (1988). 
60. The de novo formula means that the court should uphold the agency only if it agrees 
with the agency decision. The court may give "deference" to the agency but ultimately it 
must be convinced the agency is right. 
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evidence standard and one operating under that standard less than one 
operating under the arbitrary standard. 61 
Schotland provides a. less concrete but perhaps more realistic approach. 
He observed that the word formulas describe "mood-points. " 62 That is, vari-
ous standards tell the court the critical attitude with which it should approach 
a particular administrative decision. 
Most of the controversies in the application of the word formula system 
involve a conflict between the substantial evidence standard and the arbi-
trariness standard. 63 Under the tolerance concept, the arbitrariness stan-
dard requires a greater tolerance for risk of error than the substantial 
evidence standard.64 In terms of Schotland's mood-points, the substantial 
evidence and arbitrariness standards require emotionally opposite judicial 
conclusions. The substantial evidence standard requires the court to reach 
the positive conclusion that the agency's decision is reasonable. The arbi-
trariness standard requires the court to reach the negative conclusion that 
the agency's decision is not arbitrary. By upholding the agency under the 
former, the court expresses some sense of approval, whereas in upholding 
the agency under the latter, the court expresses no more than that it was 
not offended by the administrative decision. Under this concept of the word 
formula system, the context in which the decision is made does not affect 
the level of review. 
The reviewing court must determine which standard applies and then 
obey the mandates of that standard. 55 Although the word formula system 
works in the simple review cases, it often fails in the complex review situ-
ations.66 The system evolved during a simpler era when the vast majority 
of administrative decisions involved economic regulation and resulted from 
a few well-established procedural models.67 It has not matched the evolu-
61. Operationally, there is a crucial break between de novo or what I call agreement review, 
testing for correctness, and the other two standards. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at 90. For exam-
ple, the substantial evidence word formula requires a test for reasonableness. Although this 
standard appears a term of art, in ordinary speech, we regularly rely on the difference between 
examination for correctness and that for reasonableness. E.g., BEYOND NUMERACY: RUMI-
NATIONS OF A NUMBERS MAN 54 (1991) (As a math teacher, "I usually give full credit for 
wrong answers if only the 'math' is wrong but the concept is correct, and partial credit if the 
approach is a reasonable one."). 
62. Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action-Remarks Before the D.C. Circuit judi-
cial Conference, 34 FED. B.J. 54,59 (1975). 
63. Levin, Scope-of Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 239 (1986). 
64. See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text discussing the "abuse of discretion" 
word formula. In terms of the degree of judicial scrutiny, the abuse of discretion word formula 
conveys the same level of judicial review as the arbitrariness standard. 
65. E.g., Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965,969-70 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
66. Levin, supra note 2, at 9-13. A valiant effort to reform the word formula system was 
undertaken by the ABA's Administrative Law Section. See Levin, supra note 63. 
67. Decisions that were challenged in court generally were the result of formal adjudi-
cation. The substantial evidence test served the purpose of telling the courts to do less review 
than that of a lower court under the "clearly erroneous" test. It also admonished the courts 
not to substitute judgment by conducting de novo review. The distinction between substan-
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tion of the administrative process and the diversification of the administra-
tive state. 
The word formula system lacks flexibility. The system leads a court to 
evaluate an entire administrative decision, no matter how complex, under 
a single review standard. Substantial evidence is applied to the entire deci-
sion resulting from formal, trial-like processes and arbitrariness is applied 
to decisions resulting from any informal process. Indeed, when informal 
agency action, both rulemaking and adjudication, became more prevalent, 
many commentators contended that the standards had meaning only in terms 
of the nature of the administrative procedure and the record it. produced. 68 
Commentators found that substantial evidence review and arbitrariness 
review were indistinguishable when applied to an informal record. Future 
Justice Scalia advocated this approach. 69 
tial evidence and arbitrariness worked because it expressed the distinction between review 
of facts found through formal adjudication and review of facts and policymaking undertaken 
through rulemaking. See FINAL REP., supra note 32, at 117-20. 
68. Judge Friendly's opinion might have been the first judicial adoption of this approach: 
The respondents ask us to apply a standard of review less severe than the substantial 
evidence test. They point to what they consider an anomaly in subjecting notice and 
comment rulemaking, which has here produced a regulation essentially legislative in nature, 
to the substantial evidence test, which under the AP A, 5 U .S.C. § 706(2)(E), applies only 
to determinations resulting from adjudication, 5 U.S.C. § 554, and rules "required by 
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing," 5 U .S.C. 
§ 553(c) .... 
While we have felt constrained to determine and sustain the applicability of the substantial 
evidence test, it may well be that the controversy is semantic in some degree, at least in 
the context of informal rulemaking, and that it lacks the dispositional importance that 
respondents imply .... 
In WBEN, Inc. v. United States, while we applied to F.C.C. rulemaking the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), it is hard to see in what respect we would 
have treated the question differently if we had been applying a "substantial evidence" test. 
Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 347-49 (2d Cir. 1973) (citation 
omitted). 
69. Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 684-
86 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Justice Scalia adopted this view well before he took his place on the 
bench: 
A consumer product safety rule promulgated by the Commission under Section 9 is 
judicially reviewable in a court of appeals under Section II. The rule cannot be affirmed 
"unless the Commission's findings under subsection 9(c) are supported by substantial 
evidence on the record taken as a whole." For the purposes of this provision, "record" is 
defined in a fashion which is to our knowledge unique in legislative draftsmanship, and 
perhaps in human contemplation: 
"For purposes of this section, the term 'record' means such consumer product safety 
rule; any notice or proposal published pursuant to section 7, 8, or 9; the transcript required 
by section 9(a)(2) of any oral presentation; any written submission of interested parties; 
and any other information which the Commission considers relevant to such rule." 
The obvious purpose and effect of the last clause is to make "record" include that which 
in lawyerly and even common parlance would more precisely be described by the term 
"non-record." This verbal absurdity is more than accidental; it reveals a basic problem 
that has developed in the judicial review of informal rulemaking. 
The two most frequently applied statutory bases for setting aside agency action, findings, 
and conclusions are (I) the determination that they are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
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As evidenced by Curtin Matheson, this approach robs the review system 
of both flexibility and precision. For example, Justice Scalia felt compelled 
to apply the heightened judicial scrutiny of the substantial evidence test to 
agency policymaking because the policymaking occurred in a formal adju-
dication. Following his view of the traditional word formula system, he would 
have applied the less demanding arbitrariness standard to policymaking 
through rulemaking. 70 
Under this review strategy, the judicial role is tightly structured: formal 
record means the entire decision must be tested for reasonableness; infor-
mal record means the entire decision must be tested for arbitrariness. This 
strategy lacks technique for more flexible and precise delineation of the 
judicial role. How would Congress, for example, prescribe heightened scru-
tiny for selected rulemaking if courts felt free to ignore the statutory stan-
dard of review because of the nature of the record? How could judges 
themselves evolve more sophisticated review strategies? 
Either Congress or the courts, for example, might determine that certain 
policy determinations should be reviewed in the same matter whether the 
agency makes the determination in adjudication or rulemaking. 71 
The process-oriented word formula system may also be too superficial in 
defining the review of different types of rules. One of the most venerable 
principles of administrative law is that legislative rules, those made pursuant 
to statutory authority, have the force of law and are binding on the courts 
unless arbitrary but nonlegislative rules, interpretative rules, and general 
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"; and (2) the determination that they 
are "unsupported by substantial evidence in a case ... reviewed on the record of an agency 
hearing provided by statute." While the former is applicable to review of all agency action, 
the latter is an additional rigor imposed upon on-the-record adjudication and rulemak-
ing-that is, in those instances the action must not only be shown to be not arbitrary, 
capricious, abusive of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, but also must 
be shown to be a reasonable action on the basis of the evidence adduced in the required 
proceedings and without reference to extrinsic evidence that the parties had no oppor-
tunity to refute. This scheme is entirely rational, and is indeed essential to the distinctive 
character and purpose of an on-the-record proceeding. 
What appears to have happened, however, is that the "substantial evidence" test has 
acquired a vague reputation as the more demanding of the two without appreciation of 
the fact that it is only rationally applicable to an "on-the-record" proceeding. As a result, 
it has in recent legislation apparently been included when Congress has desired particularly 
"tight" review, without reference to whether the reviewed proceeding was "on the record." 
This mistakes the nature of the standard. The essential constraint of the "substantial 
evidence" test is not that it requires a higher degree of support for an agency determi-
nation (the arbitrary and capricious standard itself would probably be violated by a deter-
mination made on the basis of insubstantial evidence) but rather, that it requires this support 
to be contained within the confines of the public record made pursuant to the provisions 
of sections 556 and 557 of the Administrative Procedure Act. If there are no such confines, 
there can be no such constraint .... 
Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20 UCLA L. REV. 
899, 933-35 (1973) (footnotes omitted). 
70. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 40-41 
(1983). 
71. See generally Diver, supra note 51. 
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statements of policy are not binding because they are not the direct result 
of the delegated authority to make rules. 72 The distinction is justified by 
the absence of express authority and public procedures in the promulgation 
of non legislative rules. As to certain types of issues, however, the vast differ-
ence in the review of these types of rules may be too great. Certain types 
of policy choices, for example, may justify limited review even if announced 
in a nonlegislative rule. 
The nature of each issue resolved by the decision and not the nature of 
the process should define the judicial role. If the review system is to ration-
ally allocate decisionmaking functions, it must do so according to all the 
factors affecting the relative decisionmaking advantages of the courts and 
the bureaucracy and not just the nature of the administrative decisionmak-
ing process. While process advantages must be part of the computation, 
those advantages alone should not be controlling. The system should not 
compel a judge to review, say, a particular type of policy choice lightly if it 
happens to be made in informal rulemaking, more severely if made in formal 
adjudication and still more severely if made in another type of rulemak-
ing. 73 The search for the appropriate level of review must reach beyond 
the decisionmaking process. 
The word formula strategy is too simplistic to adequately express the 
complex relationships between the courts and the bureaucracy. Thus, Justice 
Marshall's intuition to ignore the admonishment to focus on the formality 
of the administrative procedures is important. By defining review according 
to the type of issue in question, he incorporated the advantages of an issue-
sensitive form of review. 
IV. REVIEW OF FACT-FINDING 
Justice Scalia's view that the controverted issues were factual, not so much 
his weak effort to apply the process-driven word formula system, formed 
the center of the controversy in Curtin Matheson. The contrast between his 
efforts to review fact-finding in contrast to Justice Marshall's efforts to review 
policy demonstrates the versatility of the issue-driven strategy. 
Traditionally, fact-finding demands its own review strategy. 74 As with 
policymaking, questions of fact are and should be dominated by the agency 
72. I KocH, supra note 2, at § 3.52. 
73. See generally McGarity, supra note 2. 
74. The plurality Supreme Court opinion in Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101, 
2111-12 (1986), demonstrates that when necessary the courts rely on this difference. In Bowen, 
the court conceded to the agency substantial authority in "governing" but raised the level of 
review of the factual conclusions that support the exercise of that power. "Our recognition of 
Congress' need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of 
governing a vast and complex industrial Nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of 
the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its decision, even though we show respect 
for the agency's judgment in both." /d. at 2112. 
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decision makers. 75 Nonetheless, as evidenced by the conflicting opinions in 
Curtin Matheson, the review strategies as to these two categories of agency 
dominated issues will differ in kind and degree. 
The act of fact-finding differs fundamentally from determinations of 
policy. Jaffe provided a useful working definition: "A finding of fact is the 
assertion that a phenomenon has happened or is or will be happening inde-
pendent of or anterior to any assertion as to its legal effect. " 76 Thus, for 
our purposes, a "fact" is something done or having existence or informa-
tion with objective reality. 77 Fact-finding, while different from policymak-
ing, is no less important. Justice Scalia concluded his dissent with "Chief 
justice Hughes' description of the unscrupulous administrator's prayer: 'Let 
me find the facts for the people of my country, and I care little who lays 
down the general principles.' " 78 
Justice Scalia's review strategy focused on the factual nature of the Board's 
decision. Nonetheless, he too recognized that the agency's authority, and 
hence the limits on judicial authority, over fact-finding is quite different 
from its authority over policymaking. Here he found that the NLRB's 
conclusions were "bad fact-finding, and must be reversed under the 
'substantial evidence' test. " 79 Here also he recognized that the limitations 
on review of the two differ in kind as well as degree. 80 Justice Scalia 
contended that the NLRB circumvented scrutiny of its policymaking by 
appearing to apply factual presumptions just as the majority had conducted 
inappropriate review by reviewing those presumptions as policy. 81 In the 
75. Intermittently, the idea appears that certain types of facts, sometimes known as 'jurisdic-
tional facts" or "constitutional facts," should be dominated by the courts, i.e., administrative find-
ings of such facts should be subject to de novo review. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at 125-28. Support 
for the concept of constitutional facts can be found in Strong, The Persistent Doctrine of "Consti-
tutional Fact," 46 N.C.L. REV. 223 (1968). 
76. L.jAFFE,jUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 548 (1965) (emphasis omitted); 
accord B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 650 (2d ed. 1984) ("Analytically, a question offact 
is only a question of whether something has happened independent of any assertion as to its legal 
effect."). 
77. One trial judge found E.B. White's definition of "fact" meaningful:" 'Use this word only 
of matters capable of verification, not matters of judgment.' " L. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT: 
THE MOUNTING THREAT OF LIBEL AND INVASION OF PRIVACY ACTIONS TO THE fiRST 
AMENDMENT 267 (1987). 
78. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., I I 0 S. Ct. I 542, I 566 (I 990) (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
79. /d. at I 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
80. While the word formula system works better in defining review of fact-finding, Curtin 
Matheson demonstrates its weakness as a complete review strategy. 
81. This comment is based on a valuable observation about the relationship among presump-
tions, inferences, fact-finding and policymaking. Scalia observed that presumptions operate quite 
differently from inferences and that the majority's mistake resulted from the failure to recognize 
this difference. The agency may create presumptions "in the teeth of the facts, as means of imple-
menting authorized law or policy in the course of adjudication." I 10 S. Ct. at 1564 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in original). Inferences (or presumptions of fact) are not created by the 
agency but control the agency "representing the dictates of reason and logic that must be applied 
in making adjudicatory factual determinations." /d. Scalia concluded: 
[T]he Board may choose to implement authorized law or policy in adjudication by forbid-
ding a rational inference, just as it may do so by requiring a non rational one (which is what 
a presumption of law is) .... But that is not what the agency did here. It relied on the 
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end justice Scalia commented: "[The NLRB] is not entitled to disguise poli-
cymaking as fact-finding, and thereby to escape the legal and political limi-
tations to which policymaking is subject. " 82 That statement seems to admit 
that his review of policymaking would have been different even in the 
context of adjudication. 
The bundle of issues resulting in a given administrative decision may 
contain different types of factual issues. For generations, administrative law 
has used the distinction between specific facts ("adjudicative" facts) or 
general facts ("legislative" facts), 83 and that distinction should guide review. 
Review strategy that distinguishes facts is superior to one that reviews facts 
differently depending on the procedures used to develop them. Although 
some courts, including the majority in Curtin Matheson, instinctively vary 
their review for certain types of facts, the practice needs to become a formal 
aspect of our general review strategy. 
Specific facts are by nature central to determinations of individual rights 
and duties, and hence they have a unique importance to a system that prizes 
individualization.84 They also differ from general facts in that specific facts 
can be "proven" in the traditional ways and do not raise the same kinds of 
evaluation problems as do general facts. For these reasons, courts might 
review these facts very closely. 
reasoning of [a prior case], which rested upon the conclusion that, as a matter of logic and 
reasoning, ''the hiring of permanent replacements who cross a picket line, in itself, does 
not support an inference that the replacements repudiate the union as collective-bargain-
ing representative." That is simply false. It is bad factfinding, and must be reversed under 
the "substantial evidence" test. 
/d. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
The agency could make policy that ignored or repudiated relevant facts but it cannot 
purport to find facts that a court cannot accept as reasonable. Justice Scalia's problem with 
the Board's conduct was not that it may not adopt "counterfactual policy determination" 
but that it may not do so "as ordinary factfinding." /d. at I 565 (Scalia,J ., dissenting). When 
the agency is making policy, it must say so and do so through policymaking processes. Here 
he found that the Board undertook fact-finding and did not do so adequately. 
82. /d. at I 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
83. Although for the purposes of this analysis the terms "specific" and "general" facts 
seem sufficient, the terms "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts may have a richer meaning: 
The key difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not the characteristics 
of particular versus general facts, but rather, evidence whose proof has a more established 
place and more predictable effect within a framework of established legal rules as distinct 
from evidence that is more manifestly designed to create the rules. The line between adju-
dicative and legislative facts is indistinct, however, because decision makers use even the 
most particularized facts to make legal rules. 
Wool handler, Rethinking the judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 4 I V AND. L. REV. Ill, 114 
(1988); see also 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 15.03 (1958); Davis, An 
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404-07 
(1942). The idea has been applied outside administrative law, particularly in evidence. E.g., 
Advisory Committee's Notes, FED. R. EVID. 20 I. 
In the context of a review strategy, the distinction between general and specific seems 
sufficient. 
84. "When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate parties-who did 
what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent-the court or agency is performing 
an adjudicative function, and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts." 2 K. DAVIS, 
supra note 83, at 353. 
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The present word formula system decides the degree of judicial scrutiny 
of specific facts based on the formality of the procedures. If the fact is found 
through formal adjudication then review is substantial evidence (reasona-
bleness); if the fact is found through informal processes then review is arbi-
trariness. ~ 5 In terms of the comparative basis that gives these word formulas 
meaning, the court is instructed to give less scrutiny to specific facts found 
on an informal record and more scrutiny to those found on a formal record. 
In short, the present system requires less review for cases involving less 
procedure.86 Again, the level of review should depend on the comparative 
advantages of courts and agencies over the types of issues rather than the 
nature of the processY 
Review of specific facts involves the tension between the importance of 
individual rights and the needs of society. Resolution of such factual issues 
seem to score high on all three of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors. 88 Specific 
facts are extremely important to the individual and additional consideration 
may substantially contribute to accuracy, but the facts are so numerous that 
cost-effective resolution is important to the operation of many government 
programs. How should these tensions be played out in designing a review 
system? Since judicial review is undeniably costly, the answer must depend 
on the judicial capacity to improve the ultimate decision. Several factors 
weigh on this decision. 
Process advantages argue for administrative dominance over questions of 
specific fact. The administrative process can be designed to take advantage 
of the most cost-effective approach to specific facts. Also, the nature of 
specific fact-finding necessarily limits review; specific facts often involve 
decisions as to testamentary competence and reliability. Usually such issues 
are controlled by the on-site decisionmaker and effective review would create 
redundancies. For these reasons, the decision might be left to the admin-
istrative level fact finder. 
Other factors, however, countervail arguments for limited review of 
specific facts. Since the final decision in the administrative process itself is 
usually made by an appellate administrative authority that has not actually 
heard the evidence, the appellate judicial authority might· have equal 
85. Rulemaking rarely, if ever, depends on finding of specific facts. 
86. While it seems irrational to define the review function for specific facts inversely to 
the formality of the process, it may make some sense from a decisionmaking resource allo-
cation point-of-view. The argument for this result is that extensive judicial review of facts 
found on an informal record would rejudicialize decisionmaking that had been assigned 
intentionally to nonjudicialized decisionmaking. United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 
209-10 ( 1982). Control of the potential costs of comprehensive judicial review of findings 
of specific facts might be more effectively incorporated into the review system through less 
structured and more sensitive law. 
87. Levin, supra note 63, at 272 ("[T]here is no logical reason for courts to give a partic-
ular fact finding less critical scrutiny when it underlies a regulation than they would have 
given it if it had underlain an adjudicative order."). 
88. 424 u.s. 319, 335 (1976). 
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competence.89 Also, limited judicial scrutiny of specific facts rarely can be 
justified by a strong claim of administrative expertise.9° Findings of specific 
facts rarely depend on technical expertise and the most an agency can claim 
is substantial experience dealing with certain specific facts. Moreover, judges 
are accustomed to reviewing specific facts because they do so in reviewing 
inferior courts. Judges then have the capacity to make a nearly equal contri-
bution to the resolution of specific factual questions. 
Nonetheless, administrative tribunals make millions of findings of specific 
fact every day. In economics jargon, the degree of agency dominance over 
specific facts should be measured by the bureaucracy's "comparative advan-
tage. " 91 If courts were to review these findings with any depth, they would 
be paralyzed and unable to perform more important functions. The key is 
how much responsibility over specific facts can we afford to assign to the 
courts. Here the opportunity costs are immense. It seems likely that judicial 
review of agency determinations of specific fact will not increase accuracy 
equal to the increase in decisionmaking costs. 92 If we mire the courts in the 
mass of specific factual decisions, even controversial ones, made by the 
bureaucracy, we will prevent the courts from performing much more 
important functions to which they can make a greater contribution.93 
Thus, the courts may have the capacity to review findings of specific fact 
very closely but should not. The reasonable trade-offs offered by Mathews 
would suggest that the cost of extensive review to society usually would be 
far greater than the benefits to the individual. This argues for the courts 
generally accepting the agency's finding and for review law that instructs 
89. In fact, current review doctrine incorporates this idea by increasing the judicial scru-
tiny of certain types of agency decisions when the administrative appellate authority disagrees 
with the presiding official. I KocH SUPP., supra note 2, at § 6.54A. 
90. For example, Social Security Administration disability cases use medical and voca-
tional expert evidence, as in a judicial proceeding, but the decisions are made by lawyers 
(administrative law judges) after the initial stage. F. BLOCH, FEDERAL DISABILITY LAW AND 
PRACTICE § 4.20 ( 1984). 
91. "Comparative advantage" is an economics term that seems to soften the controversy 
here. In economics, it is a way of conceptualizing the efficient allocation of functions among 
various productive units. If Y is better than X at everything, it is still better that X perform 
some functions, the functions for which Y's effort is of less value. As to these functions, X 
has a comparative advantage even if not an absolute advantage. Here it allows us to avoid 
an argument over the relative competence of the two institutions and still argue for allocating 
dominance between them. Comparative advantage might suggest that, for example, even 
though the courts are always better decisionmakers, we optimize decisionmaking resources 
if we assign some decision-making tasks to the bureaucracy. A general description of compar-
ative advantage can be found in most basic economics texts. See, e.g., A. ALCHIAN & W. 
ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION, & CONTROL 141-43 (3d 
ed. 1983). 
92. j. MASHAW, C. GOETT, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW, 
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS (A Study for the National Center for Adminis-
trative Justice), 146-47 (1978) ("The contribution of court-review to accuracy through its 
corrective function is modest at best."). 
93. Indeed the burden on the courts may be affecting their ability to contribute. Strauss, 
One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for 
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. I 093, 1100-08 (1987). 
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courts to tolerate a reasonably high risk of error. Courts should intervene 
only at the extreme. 
Nonetheless, there may be circumstances that support exceptions to this 
general principle. The system, and a reviewing court, should base its accep-
tance of administrative decisions in a specific program on some judgment 
as to the value of the judicial contribution. The depth of the judicial scru-
tiny should depend on a judgment as to the general risk of error created 
by acceptance of the agency dominance in the particular decisionmaking 
context. The review system then should develop a consistent judicial strat-
egy as to these special circumstances. An issue-driven strategy would allow 
the trade-offs to be faced up front and not hidden by formalism. 
Many administrative decisions depend on conclusions of general or legis-
lative facts. 94 The questions raised in developing a review strategy for these 
facts are quite different from those raised by review of specific facts. Courts 
do tend to conduct more limited review of general facts. 95 
In support of the Board's policy conclusions in Curtin Matheson, Justice 
Marshall agreed with its approach "as an empirical matter. " 96 He kept review 
of this empirical support, that is, the Board's findings of general facts, very 
limited. Justice Marshall concluded that factual conclusions contrary to the 
Board's were not inevitable.97 Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his 
concurring opinion, found that the Board's conclusions "press to the limit 
the deference to which the Board is entitled in assessing industrial real-
ity. " 98 Justice Blackmun in dissent also accepted the Board's power over the 
general facts at issue. He suggested that he would strike down only "an 
implausible assessment of industrial reality."99 On the factual issues, he was 
concerned that there appeared to be a total "lack of empirical support." 100 
Even Justice Scalia, who attempted to apply the substantial evidence test to 
the facts, seemed to adopt subconsciously a very restrained level of review. 
He concluded that "it seems to me impossible to conclude on this record" 
that the Board's fact-finding is reasonable. 101 
Judicial restraint in the face of findings of general fact results from several 
factors. The agencies generally have or develop expertise as to all general 
facts that are relevant to their functions. Often this expertise is more expe-
94. "When a court or an agency develops law or policy, it is acting legislatively ... the 
facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment are called legislative facts." 2 K. DAVIS, 
supra note 83, at 353. 
95. E.g., Bradford Nat'l Clearing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(even where substantial evidence review is authorized, courts should limit their review of 
general facts); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 83-85 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 
(reviewing courts should give less scrutiny to agency inference from available data and exist-
ing knowledge). 
96. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1550 (1990). 
97. I d. at 1552-53. 
98. /d. at 1554 (Rehnquist, C.J ., concurring). 
99. /d. at 1556 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting). 
100. Jd. 
I 0 I. /d. at 1557 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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rience than actual knowledge. But the agency nonetheless has had broader 
experience with a wide range of general facts and is often capable of making 
a more sophisticated decision as to general facts. 
The dominance of the agency may also depend on its efficacy for eval-
uating the correctness of findings of general facts. Finding general facts 
usually incorporates a point of view. A well-schooled point of view is supe-
rior and hence the agency has an advantage. It is simply not easy to say that 
a conclusion of general fact has been demonstrated and that correctness 
depends on who decides the question. Judges often seize on the most obvi-
ous answer, but a sophisticated decisionmaker sees the full complexity of 
the question. If the court abuses its position, it adds inaccuracy. A reviewing 
court then must be tolerant of the administrative conclusion if the program 
is to have the sophistication envisioned by the delegation to the agency in 
the first place. 
The agencies also have a process advantage. Rulemaking allows the agency 
to develop records specifically designed for finding such facts. 102 Rulemak-
ing also allows experts actually to participate in the decisionmaking itself. 
Even in adjudication the agencies have processes better designed for find-
ing general facts and for incorporating expert judgments. 
On close consideration, however, these advantages are not overpowering. 
The agency expertise advantages as to many general facts are important 
but do not suggest that the courts cannot make a substantive contribution. 
In many situations, the court can use the agency expertise in its own deci-
sionmaking and hence determine how it can best contribute. Because the 
actual administrative decisionmaking usually is left to a generalist bureau-
crat, indistinguishable in training from a judge, the expertise argument is 
weakened further. 
Similarly, the process advantage in fact-gathering does not necessarily 
translate into an advantage in the fact-finding. The court can review general 
facts on the record developed by the agency. 103 The courts, therefore, are 
very much disadvantaged in directing the search for data, but less disad-
vantaged in drawing conclusions from the 'data. These considerations 
diminish the administrative advantage. 
In addition, the breadth of the impact of many findings of general facts 
increases the overall value of the judicial contribution. Although adjust-
ments in specific facts might have substantial impact on one individual, even 
a small improvement in a general fact-finding may affect an array of indi-
viduals. Close judicial scrutiny of general facts offers a substantial net bene-
fit to society if that scrutiny can be expected to bring about even an 
102. ArrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 14 (1947) 
("Typically, the issues [in rulemakingj relate not to the evidentiary facts ... but rather to 
the policy-making conclusions to be drawn from the facts."). 
I 03. Courts now review rulemaking records compiled by the agency even though they 
cannot themselves develop such records. The character of the record presents no great obsta-
cle to an expanded judicial role with respect to general facts. 
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incremental improvement in accuracy. The decisionmaking resource argu-
ment for limited review is not as strong as in review of specific facts. Thus 
for many general facts the courts can have a relatively significant role perhaps 
almost equal to that of the agency. 
This all pushes in a revolutionary direction. It may be that the law should 
develop in the direction of more judicial scrutiny of many decisions of 
general facts. 104 Indeed, courts often feel compelled to engage in close scru-
tiny of general facts. 105 These courts are called activist but they may not be 
following that judicial philosophy at all. The real problem is that the law 
does not permit them to do what they know needs to be done. 
The nature of this review must reflect the comparative advantages of the 
two institutions. The agencies are superior fact gatherers and hence the 
courts should do little monitoring of fact-gathering. Yet review cannot allow 
the agencies unlimited authority in determining what facts to gather. The 
"hard look" approach works well here. 106 In evaluating the accumulation 
of the relevant facts, it should be enough for the courts to determine that 
the agency did a careful job of fact-gathering. 107 The heightened review 
will increase only the evaluation of the conclusions drawn from the data 
compiled. 108 
I 04. The word formula system has artificially constrained this development because it has 
based heightened review on the formality of the record, and it has tended to require little 
scrutiny of general facts because they are usually made in informal rulemaking. 
105. E.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
106. Simply, using hard look review, the courts look closely at whether the agency has 
taken a hard look at the question (i.e., the court is not to take a hard look itself). Hard Look 
retains the focus on the administrative decision while intensifying judicial scrutiny, especially 
where the agency action is questionable. Nonetheless judicial inquiry carefully examines the 
decisionmaking elements in a way that does not interfere with the administrative decision-
making itself. The "hard look" doctrine was hinted at by Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston 
Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 
(1971) and formed later in an article, Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role 
of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509, 514 (1974). Slowly it has evolved into a staple element 
of modern judicial review theory. See Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: 
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE 
L.J. 387, 419-21 (arguing that strict reasons requirement results from the recent increase 
in substantive review). 
I 07. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard- Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177, 183 ("The 
substantive component of the hard-look doctrine is a judicial willingness to overturn decisions 
that appear unjustified in light of the evidentiary record. This aspect of the doctrine has 
been rarely exercised.") (footnotes omitted). 
I 08. However, some legislative facts are very judgmental and require the reviewing court 
to be particularly sensitive to the intended allocation of decisionmaking authority. For exam-
ple, Fox contrasted the voting of two recent FTC chairmen on the decision to take action 
against the General Motors-Toyota joint venture: 
[Ojne who believes that the forces of competition are robust would not see any costs to 
the American consumer. On the other hand, ... one who is sympathetic to the view that 
the market is susceptible to collusion and that independent action of major market factors 
tend to yield more progressiveness than combinations, and one who predicts that govern-
ment trade restraints will persist or recur, is likely to foresee that the social costs of the 
joint venture will overwhelm its possible benefits . 
. . . World views about big business and its power, about consumers and their sovereignty, 
and about the power of business and the power of government, and which is the more to 
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Some general facts, however, are clearly more a function of expertise 
than others. Thus, at least with respect to a review strategy, we might spin 
out from the traditional notion of legislative facts a separate category: tech-
nical facts. 109 Conclusions as to these facts involve special training and 
expertise. It is readily recognized that many conclusions reached by the 
agency are the result of a technical competence that even the most arrogant 
nonexpert could not hope to replicate. 110 
Generalist courts should not involve themselves in these decisions. 111 The 
argument for protecting this group of general facts, however, has spilled 
over into other general facts for which the courts could, as discussed above, 
make a useful contribution. 112 Therefore, one reason for trying to separate 
this group from most general facts is to allow the law to develop in the 
direction of increased review for many other general facts. 
As to technical facts, however, courts should continue to proceed with 
great care. A court really cannot make up for its deficiencies here; compe-
tency is not merely in testing the validity of the factual record and evalu-
ating the agency's jump from that record to its technical conclusion. True, 
experts disagree but, assuming they are making expert judgments, they 
disagree at a level of sophistication that is beyond the nonexpert. 113 Courts 
lack the learning to move from the facts to a defensible conclusion. Although 
federal judges are at least as inclined as other lawyers to believe they can 
learn anything in a short period, they are constrained by the absence of a 
long-term familiarity with an alien discipline. Indeed, there is substantial 
likelihood that they will decrease the validity of these decisions rather than 
increase them. 114 
be feared, determined the positions adopted by the [two commissioners f. 
Fox, Chairman Miller, the Federal Trade Commission, Economics, and RASHOMON, 50 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 54 (1987). See Bazelon, The Impact of the Courts on Public Administration, 
52 IND. L.J. 101, 108 (1976) (Even if society "knows" the risk of a certain action, somehow 
it must decide whether the action will create a net benefit.). 
109. See generally W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, P. STRAUSS, T. RAKOFF, R. SCHOTLAND, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS ch. VII,§ 4 (8th ed. 1987). 
110. E.g., Tri-Bio Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 1987); 
Thompson Medical Co., Inc. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 189, 196 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
Ill. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,569 (1980) ("Administrative 
agencies are simply better suited than courts to engage in such [an expert] process."); Federal 
Power Comm'n v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 463 (1972) ("[WJe recognize 
the relevant agency's technical expertise and experience, and defer to its analysis unless it is 
without substantial basis in fact."). 
112. McGarity, supra note 2, at 797-808 (While review of technical facts should be limited, 
"trans-scientific" facts, those on which experts cannot reach a definitive answer, should be 
more carefully reviewed). 
113. E.g., S. RHOADS, THE ECONOMIST'S VIEW OF THE WORLD: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 4-5 (1985). 
114. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra note 34, observed: 
Professor McGarity argues that scientific questions that appear to raise issues of fact 
actually raise issues that fall somewhere on a spectrum between issues of pure scientific 
fact, in the sense that the question can be answered relatively easily through application 
of existing scientific methodology, to issues of pure policy, in the sense that the question 
cannot be answered at all thJr]ough use of existing scientific methodology. Most issues lie 
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Therefore, the courts should accept agency findings of technical fact 
except in those cases where the risk of error is substantially demonstrated. 
Though they sometimes stray, most judges understand and accept their 
deficiencies as to truly technical facts. If this is confined to true technical 
facts, the restraint is necessary to deriving the full benefit from the admin-
istrative process. 115 
The restraint need apply only as to true technical findings. Justice Frank-
furter's authoritative opinion in Chenery Jl 16 limits this restraint to those 
issues over which the agency has actually exercised its technical expertise. 
A court need not show any special respect for a technical decision by a 
generalist official with no special claim to technical competence. In addi-
tion, review of policy judgments derived from such findings, while also 
limited, are limited in a different way and degree. 117 Indeed, the identifi-
cation of technical issues might depend on whether the decision itself required 
technical competence. 
V. REVIEW OF LAW IN CONTRAST TO REVIEW OF POLICY 
The restraints on review of policymaking and fact-finding should not 
diminish the judicial authority over questions of law. This principle is well 
established in general legal theory as well as in administrative law. Since 
Marbury v. Madison, the courts have dominated questions of law. 118 Admin-
istrative law has long recognized judicial dominance over questions of law 
as agencies have administrative dominance over questions of policy. 119 State, 
between these poles. 
/d. at 364 (footnote omitted). 
115. This seems preferable to educating the judges. But see Wald, Making "Informed" Deci-
sions on the District ofColumbia Circuit, 50 Gw. WASH. L. REV. 135 (1982). 
116. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,92 (1943). 
117. McGarity, supra note 2, at 809. In an article distinguishing hard scientific fact from 
"science policy," McGarity concludes: "[!]fa court recognizes that the resolution of science 
policy questions depends on striking a balance between accuracy and result-oriented policies, 
it can play a valuable substantive review role." /d. 
118. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 ( 1803) ("It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). The FAPA attempts to 
incorporate this long-standing concept. Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human 
Servs., 816 F.2d 796, 801 (1st Cir. 1987). Subsection (A) permits the court to strike down 
conclusions that are "otherwise not in accordance with law" and subsection (C) prevents 
decisions that are "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of 
statutory right." 5 U .S.C. § 706 (1988). These phrases are clumsy and largely meaningless 
in application. Nonetheless the drafters' intention was clear: "This subsection provides that 
questions of law are for courts rather than agencies to decide in the last analysis .... " (S. 
REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 214 (1946); accord H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 278 (1946). 
119. Richard Fallon found that there are two lines of cases on the standard of review of 
questions of law. One line holds that a court can only review the agency's determination of 
law for reasonableness and the other recognizes judicial dominance. Fallon pointed out that 
the second approach is still sensitive to all the values inherent in deference: 
A requirement that courts determine questions of law independently is not completely 
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as well as federal, administrative law accepts this principle. 120 
Nothing should diminish the "well-established principle of administrative 
law" that in reviewing the bundle of issues that comprise an administrative 
decision the agency's determination is dominant as to policy but not as to 
law. 121 The best example of this long-standing principle as it applies to the 
incompatible with the "deference" that existing practice accords and that the modern 
administrative state arguably requires. At least two kinds of deference are consistent with 
the proposition that the power to engage in independent review must be vested in an article 
III court: deference to an agency's congressionally delegated lawmaking power and defer-
ence to an agency's interpretive expertise .... [A]n article III court frequently should 
conclude that Congress committed the power to resolve a particular legal question to the 
agency rather than to the courts .... 
When a court renders its ruling after an administrative agency has spoken, the agency's 
decision is a part of the legal landscape that the court appropriately takes into account. 
Even though a court must have ultimate responsibility for the correct decision of questions 
of law, no article III value forbids acknowledgement that, concerning questions to which 
administrative expertise is relevant, the agency's interpretation furnishes a presumptively 
reliable indicator of how the question ought to be resolved. In deferring in this way, a 
court does not absolve itself of responsibility for determining that issues of law are decided 
"correctly," not merely "reasonably." Nevertheless, its inquiry frequently addresses the 
reasonableness of the agency's decision. In areas of the agency's expertise, the evident 
reasonableness of its conclusion may provide a crucial basis for the court's decision. 
Fallon, supra note 2, at 983-85 (footnotes omitted). 
Actually, a sharp distinction between the two lines of cases seems unjustified; rather, some 
courts have overstated the controlling effect of administrative decisions on questions of law. 
Stephen Breyer, First Circuit judge, offered these observations as to how judges actually 
weigh agency interpretations of law: 
Inevitably, one suspects, we will find the courts actually following more varied approaches, 
sometimes deferring to agency interpretations, sometimes not, depending upon the stat-
ute, the question, the context, and what "makes sense" in the particular litigation, in light 
of the basic statute and its purposes. No particular, or single simple judicial formula can 
capture or take into account the varying responses, called for by different circumstances, 
and the need to promote a "proper," harmonious, effective or workable agency-court 
relationship. 
Breyer, supra note 2, at 38l. 
Judge Breyer suggests that the law is not so clear but he leaves no doubt as to what he 
thinks the law should be: "Would one not expect courts to conduct a stricter review of matters 
of law, where courts are more expert, but more lenient review of matters of policy, where 
agencies are more expert?" /d. at 397. 
120. E.g., Connecticut State Medical Soc'y v. Connecticut Bd. of Examiners in Podiatry, 
546 A.2d 830, 834 (Conn. 1988). 
12l. Much less confusion results from the distinction between law and facts. While there 
is sometimes confusion at the margin, courts generally seem capable of distinguishing ques-
tions of law from questions of fact and reviewing the two differently. A classic example is 
the Hearst opinion. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. Ill (1944). The issue was 
whether newsboys were "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152. The majority found that the question was not one of law for the Court to decide: 
"[W]here the question is one of specific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding 
in which the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the reviewing court's 
function is limited." /d. at 13l. The dissent, however, found the same question to be one of 
law: "The question who is an employee, so as to make the statute applicable to him, is a 
question of the meaning of the Act and, therefore, is a judicial and not an administrative 
question." /d. at 136 (Roberts, J ., dissenting). The conflicting conclusions on this issue resulted 
in the disagreement as to the final outcome of the review. 
An interesting state example is Connecticut State Medical Soc'y v. Connecticut Bd. of 
Examiners in Podiatry, 546 A.2d 830 (Conn. 1988), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court 
concluded that the question as to whether the ankle was part of the foot was a question of 
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relationship between the agency policymaking functions and the develop-
ment of law is the first Chenery case. 122 The SEC prohibited insider trading, 
not under its power to define prohibited practices, but as an interpretation 
of the law. Because it was interpreting law rather than carrying out its poli-
cymaking function, the Supreme Court said the SEC's opinion about the 
law was entitled to little extra weight. The Supreme Court noted, however, 
that if the SEC had made its own decision as an exercise of its authorized 
policymaking function, then the Court could not interfere unless that exer-
cise was arbitrary. 123 
More recent authority for the distinction between review of policy and 
review of law is Federal Communications Commission v. WNCN Listeners 
Guild.l 24 The FCC attempted to deregulate programming by a statement 
generally abandoning its "diversity" requirements. The lower court found 
that the decision as to whether the statute required deregulation was a ques-
tion of law "in which the judicial word is final." 125 The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that the decision to permit the market to decide program 
format was a question of policy rather than law.l 26 The Court held that the 
judicial function was extremely limited because the question was left to the 
"broad discretion" of the FCC in policymaking. 127 
Nonetheless, the "Chevron doctrine" 128 has caused some confusion that 
the issue-driven strategy must confront. This doctrine derives not so much 
from the Supreme Court opinion as from the interpretations of that opin-
ion. The opinion has been read to severely limit judicial review of law and 
debate rages as to how much the opinion limits review.l 29 About these inter-
law and not fact. Although surprising, it is difficult to disagree in the context of this case. 
Regardless, the outcome depended on the characterization of the issue. 
One unfortunate idea has been that of a mixed question of law and fact. Schwartz describes 
a conflict between the Friendly view and the Frankfurter-Harlan view. B. SCHWARTZ, supra 
note 76, at 650-54. The Friendly approach would change an agency finding applying law to 
facts into a mixed question of fact with limited review. The Frankfurter-Harlan approach 
would separate the legal aspects from the factual aspects. Schwartz agreed with the latter: 
"The judicial label cannot change the presence of both legal and factual elements in findings 
involving application of legal concepts to the facts of a case." /d. at 652. The Friendly approach 
is anathematic to the issue-driven review strategy. 
122. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
123. /d. at 94; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,207 (1947); Packard Motor 
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 498 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941). 
124. 450 u.s. 582 (1981). 
125. WNCN Listeners Guild v. FCC, 610 F.2d 838,855 (D.C. Cir. 1979), rev'd, 450 U.S. 
582 (1981). 
126. 450 U.S. at 592-99, 604. 
127. /d. at 594. 
128. Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
129. Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory 
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301,302 (1988) ("In the three years since the Court decided 
Chevron, the case has transformed dramatically the approach taken by courts in reviewing 
agency interpretations of statutory provisions."). But see Note, A Framework for judicial Review 
of an Agency's Statutory Interpretation: Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, 1985 DUKE L.J. 469, 4 70 ("The note concludes that Chevron, in establishing a frame-
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pretations, one might echo Justice Scalia's statement which introduced this 
article: These interpretations make "heavy weather out of what is, under 
well-established principles of administrative law, a straightforward case." 130 
Unfortunately, the Chevron opinion used some very loose language in 
distinguishing review of policy from review of law and this loose language 
has been seized upon by some to find a new restraint on the traditional 
judicial dominance over questions of law. 
The "Chevron doctrine" casts an unnecessary shadow in this previously 
well-lit corner of judicial review law. The Chevron opinion, read in the 
context of the long-standing distinction between review of law and policy, 
does not itself create this confusion. The case involved an EPA regulation 
allowing states to lump pollution sources by "bubbles" of related sources 
so that a decision to permit construction would be based on compliance by 
the "bubble" rather than the individual source. 131 The Court found that 
this was a permissible construction by the EPA of the Clean Air Act. 132 
Read with reference to "well-established principles of administrative law," 
the opinion merely reaffirms the traditional agency dominance over poli-
cymaking. The Court could not have made its intentions clearer: 
"The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created 
... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of 
rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." Morton v. Ruiz, 
415 U.S. 199, 231 ( 197 4). If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to 
fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific 
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given 
controlling weight unless they are arbitrary .... 133 
The Court did not intend to make new law about review ofpolicymaking.' 34 
The opinion quoted a 1961 opinion stating that a court should not disturb 
an agency's accommodation of "conflicting policies." 135 It upheld the EPA 
rule because the rule was "a reasonable policy choice for the agency to 
make." 136 The Court made the true nature of its holding even clearer in 
its summation: "When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory 
work of analysis for review of an agency interpretation of the statute in its charge, is a signif-
icant decision providing long-awaited guidance to the lower federal courts."). Some have 
given the opinion a "strong" reading which severely limits review of "law" and some a "weak" 
reading. Pierce, supra. The strong reading has been criticized. Sunstein, judicial Rroiew of 
Administrative Action in a Conservative Era, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 366-71 (1987). · 
130. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1557 (1990) (Scalia,J., 
dissenting). 
131. 467 U.S. at 840. 
132. /d. at 866; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(3), 7502(b)(6), 7602(j). 
133. 467 U.S. at 843-44. 
134. Justice Stevens also followed another "well-established principle of administrative 
law": the binding effect of legislative rules. "Such legislative regulations are given controlling 
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844. 
135. /d. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)). 
136. /d. (emphasis added). The court went on to justify this conclusion for the traditional 
reasons of expertise. /d. at 845-4 7. 
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provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agen-
cy's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left 
open by Congress, the challenge must fail." 137 Thus the case merely followed 
the long line of cases in which policymaking receives very limited review. 138 
Unfortunately, some read Chevron's recognition of policymaking domi-
nance as a new limit on the judicial authority over questions of law. The 
Court did caution reviewing judges that where they find "the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter." 139 The Court stated the 
obvious proposition that a court must obey the law itself: "If a court, 
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that 
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention 
is the law and must be given effect." 140 Hence, courts may be dominant 
over questions of law but they are not free agents. 141 This is not 
extraordinary. 142 
What is extraordinary, if true, is the limits some find in the opinion on 
the traditional judicial dominance over questions of law. However, one need 
only separate those portions of the opinion dealing with the agencies' tradi-
tional dominance over policymaking from those portions dealing with the 
courts' traditional dominance over questions of law to fit Chevron into a 
long line of similar cases. 
Necessarily there is a close relationship between questions of law and 
questions of policy. Indeed, law is policy that has been adopted by legislative 
action or the common law process. The two are related closely at least for 
the purposes of administrative law; however, they are widely different in 
allocation of decisionmaking authority between the judiciary and the 
bureaucracy. The failure to distinguish accurately between the two may 
lead to immense mistakes in defining review, as evidenced by the progeny 
of the Chevron decision. 
137. /d. at 866. 
138. Jordan, Deference Revisited: Politics as a Determinant of Deference Doctrine and the End 
of the Apparent Chevron Consensus, 68 NEB. L. REV. 454, 458-65 (1989); Koch,Judicial Review 
of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 469, 490-91 (1986); Note, The Chevron 
Legacy: Young v. Community Nutrition Institute Compounds the Confusion, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 113, 115-18 (1987). 
139. 467 U.S. at 842. 
140. /d. at 843 n.9. 
141. In such cases, the controversy does not represent a tension between administrative 
versus judicial decisionmaking but between judicial decisionmaking versus the legislative 
branch. See Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and 
Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REv. 657, 665 (I 988) ("The central theme of this article is that 
this role [of judicial review] can only be defined by considering the relative ability of the 
courts and the political process to resolve societal issues, a difficult task."). In a sense the 
court usurps not just the agency's authority but the legislative authority by straying into the 
realm ofpolicymaking left to the agency. Levin, supra note 2, at 21-22. 
142. Fallon, supra note 2, at 985 ("Even though a court must have ultimate responsibility 
for the correct decision of questions of law, no article III value forbids acknowledgement 
that, concerning questions to which administrative expertise is relevant, the agency's inter-
pretation furnishes a presumptively reliable indicator of how the question ought to be 
resolved."). 
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Whatever the difficulties in developing an abstract definition of "law," 143 
a working definition for these purposes is relatively straightforward. In this 
context, the term "law" refers to decisions advancing or protecting collec-
tive goals established through either the legislative process or the "common 
law" process. The necessary contrast here is between this law and what 
might be called "agency law." Where the agency is given the authority to 
decide questions of collective or societal interest, it may create "agency law." 
I choose to refer to this "law" as policy to emphasize the contrast between 
such decisions made by the agency and similar decisions made through the 
law-making processes of the legislature or the common law. Where the 
source of the decision on collective or societal interest is not the agency, 
then we have a question of "law" (sufficient for our purposes) and the courts 
are dominant. 144 Where the source is the agency, we have a question of 
"policy" and the agency is dominant. 
A similar approach was taken by Levin in his comprehensive discussion 
of review of law. 145 Basically he defined law as "normative" decisions over 
which the court has "independent" authority. 146 These normative decisions 
are taken from the sources of law, particularly Congress. If these sources 
do not make the normative decisions, or leave to the agency the authority 
to make those decisions, then the agency must exercise discretion and its 
decision is dominant. The term "normative" does not quite capture the 
shared element. For me, however, and hence I describe it instead as the 
advancement of protection of collective or societal goals. 
Regardless, the review strategy must focus on the proper allocation of 
authority over decisions with this shared element. The process of policy-
making, whether by the legislative process, the common law process or the 
administrative process, is a complex melding of general fact-finding, various 
types of expertise, and special judgment. Therefore, it seems more accurate 
to distinguish the term "law," as used to find the appropriate judicial review 
function, as decisions about collective goals made through either the legis-
lative or common law processes, from decisions about collective goals made 
through the administrative process, that is, policymaking. 147 
143. See generally R. DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE ch. I (1986) (saying that lawyers and judges 
seem to spend a good deal of time and effort doing law even though legal theorists have not 
discovered a universal definition of "law"). 
144. LjAFFE, supra note 76, at 546-48; B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 650-53. 
145. Levin, supra note 2. Levin distinguishes law and "discretion" by which he means what 
I have designated policymaking discretion. /d. at 12-13. 
146. /d. at 12. 
147. Without using the same terminology, others have found a distinction between "law" 
over which the courts have dominant authority and "agency law,"·i.e., policymaking. Breyer, 
supra note 2, at 364. Landis suggested that administrative "law" is law that the lawmaking 
branches allow the agency to make. J. LANDIS, supra note 6, at 2-3. This agency law differs 
in kind from the law over which courts have the final authority and hence the system requires 
that this law should be subject to a quite different and much more limited review. 
The drafters of the revised MSAPA also recognized a fundamental distinction between 
these two types of issues. Although it lumped these together as "law," it clearly intended 
quite different review. The comments suggest that the court review interpretations of law 
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The system then works from this distinction. If policymaking refers to 
the agency's authority to make decisions about collective goals, then the 
limits on judicial authority follow. When the law-giving authority leaves to 
the agency the power to decide how to advance or protect the collective 
goals of the community as a whole, it authorizes the agency to make policy 
rather than making the policy itself. It does not ·authorize the courts; as a 
result, the courts violate the law if they unduly infer such authority. 148 The 
limit is not on the judicial power over law but on judicial power under the 
law to exercise a policymaking function assigned elsewhere. 
This formulation solves another problem: the place of "common law" or 
evolved law in the administrative process. This traditionally is considered 
"law" in our legal system and it is not agency law or the exercise of poli-
cymaking as I use the term here. Of course, it is not supported by clear 
statutory language; yet we find much of our law outside of statutory 
language. Indeed the "law" at issue in the seminal Chenery opinion had been 
derived by the agency from judicially evolved common law. 149 Although 
conceding administrative policymaking authority, the Court held that it was 
more capable of interpreting that law than the agency. 150 In the second 
Chenery case, the agency was held to have developed policy and hence its 
decision, the same as that at issue in the first case, was subject to very limited 
reviewY' 1 Common law, where the source is the courts rather than the 
agency, is as much "law" for review purposes as is statutory law, where the 
source is the legislature rather than the agency. 
Once this distinction is recognized, it is apparent that Chevron was merely 
applying the "well-established principle of administrative law" compelling 
judicial restraint in reviewing administratively developed policy. Rather than. 
new limits on the review of law, the problem is its simplistic definition of 
the term "law" itself. The criticism has overreacted to the Court's loose 
language. In addition to imprecision as to the distinction between legislative 
law and policy or agency law, however, the opinion also created some confu-
sion aboutjudicial authority over law. 
The opinion created confusion by expressing the "well-established 
to see if it "merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation." MSAPA, supra note 2, § 5-
116 and comment to (c)(4). "By contrast, with regard to the agency's application of the law 
to specific situations, the enabling statute normally confers some discretion upon the agency. 
Accordingly, a court should find reversible error in the agency's application of the law only 
if the agency has improperly exercised its discretion [under the limited review provided else-
where in the section]." ld. (emphasis added). Thus, in my terms, a court can reverse the 
latter "agency law" only if it finds that the agency has "improperly exercised its [policymak-
ingJ discretion." 
148. The threshold question may also ask whether the agency's exercise of policymaking 
is consistent with the legislative concept. Garland, Deregulation and judicial Review, 98 HARV. 
L. REv. 507, 587 ( 1985)("U nder the emerging model, courts ensure not only that fidelity to 
congressional purpose marks the outer bounds of agency discretion, but also that it animates 
the exercise of that discretion."). 
149. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
150. ld. at 88-89. 
151. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,207-08 (1947). 
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administrative law principles" counseling judicial respect for the informed 
administrative opinions concerning questions of law. Chevron said that "a 
court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision" for 
that of the agency; it immediately followed that statement by noting "[ w ]e 
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to 
administer. ... " 152 In admonishing reviewing courts against freely substi-
tuting judgment for the agency's determinations of law, the Court said no 
more than that "the principle of deference to administrative interpreta-
tions" has been consistently followed. 153 The Court is talking of the "weight" 
and "deference" the law has provided for generations. 154 These terms 
connote respect; they do not establish binding effect. Such deference is 
another "well-established principle of administrative law." 155 Otherwise the 
opinion demands only that reviewing courts take care to carry out the will 
of Congress as expressed in the statute and not impose their own 
judgments. 156 
152. Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,844 (1984) (emphasis 
added). 
153. (Citing Supreme Court cases decided in 1943, 1944, 1945, and 1953. 
154. The Court merely observed that if a court finds the statute clear "that is the end of 
the matter." /d. at 842. From this, commentators and lower courts have spawned the useless 
review strategy know as the "Chevron two step." Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should 
Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. I, 17 (1990). 
The Court recently applied the Chevron doctrine in Sullivan v. Everhart, II 0 S. Ct. 960, 
964 ( 1990). It asked the two step question: 
(I) is the intent of Congress clear; 
(2) if not, is the agency's meaning permissible. 
The Court held, 5-4, that the Tenth Circuit had misinterpreted the statute. Justice Scalia 
first determined that the statute was not clearly against the agency's interpretation. The 
dissent, however, asserted that he and four other Justices did not understand the "plain terms 
of the statute." /d. at 968 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While it seems odd that a case which could 
be decided under the "plain terms of the statute" should even reach the Supreme Court, it 
is even more odd that five Justices could not understand that "plain meaning." Because of 
his difficulty in grasping the plain meaning of the statute,Justice Scalia was forced to consider 
whether the agency's interpretation was "permissible." Having determined that the agency's 
interpretation was permissible, Justice Scalia then determined whether the agency's policy 
development was arbitrary and concluded that it was not. /d. at 966-67. For me, this case 
demonstrates the unnecessary formality of the Chevron doctrine. In Curtin Matheson, Justice 
Marshall merely stated that the Board's policymaking was "consistent with the Act." If the 
agency's action might be illegal then a court should decide that question. If the agency is 
exercising a legitimate policymaking function then the court should test for arbitrariness. 
Courts have proceeded in this manner for generations and there seems to be no justification 
for adding the structured clumsiness of the Chevron doctrine. 
155. See Fallon, supra note 2, at 984 ("At least two kinds of deference are consistent with 
the proposition that the power to engage in independent review must be vested in an article 
Ill court: deference to an agency's congressionally delegated lawmaking power and defer-
ence to an agency's interpretive expertise."). 
156. The F AP A provides for review of constitutional issues involved in agency decisions. 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B); see also MSAPA § 5-116(c)(l). Where the law is constitutional law, 
deference to the agency interpretation will be slight. Such review is limited because review 
of legislation per se is limited. See generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 
MINN. L. REv. I (1980). Although courts give little deference to agency constitutional judg-
ments, two basic categories of constitutional challenges to agency action are generally subjected 
540 43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 511 
Any other reading of Chevron would eliminate the well-established 
authority and necessary contributions of the courts in interpreting statutory 
law and would ignore the other potent and well-established source of law 
in Anglo-American jurisprudence: the evolution of law through the common 
law process. 157 The Supreme Court gave no indication that it was under-
taking such a fundamental change in our legal theory. 158 It merely wanted 
the agencies to continue to exercise their policymaking functions within 
their well-accepted authority to do so but left to the courts the power to 
interpret statutes and otherwise develop law. 159 
Thus no change has been made in the "well-established principle of 
administrative law" that courts are the final arbiters of questions of law. 
While giving deference to agency interpretations, they may uphold the 
agency's legal judgments only if they agree. Regardless of the theoretical 
debate over the unfortunate "Chevron doctrine," in practice courts gener-
to more limited review. The first, due process, usually involves a constitutional minimum and 
a reasonable procedure will probably receive little judicial scrutiny. The second, the nonde-
legation doctrine, also tends to raise little judicial support. Most administrative law author-
ities see the doctrine as virtually defunct. E.g., S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 68-85 (2d ed. 1985). To some extent this limited review can 
be attributed to the fact that a challenge to a delegation actually questions the congressional 
action, i.e., the delegating statute, rather than the administrative action. 
157. Recent decisions suggest that the Court never intended to limit the traditional judi-
cial methods for interpreting statutory language. InK Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 
181 I ( 1988), the plurality found that "traditional tools of statutory construction" should be 
used. /d. at 1822 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). In Public Citizen v. Department 
of Justice, I 09 S. Ct. 2558 (1989), a majority of the Court relied on such tools to interpret 
a statutory provision. They used legislative history and the canons of construction to deter-
mine that Congress had made its intent clear. /d. at 2567, 2572. The concurring justices said 
that the "plain language" of the statute determines whether a statutory provision is ambig-
uous, and since this language was not clear, the Court should have considered deference to 
the agency's interpretation. /d. at 2578 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Although upholding the agency, the majority opinion in Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 
( 1991 ), seemed to be following the traditional strategy for the review of a regulation. The 
challenge, as the Court noted, was limited to the facial legality (and constitutionality) of the 
regulation and hence only questions of law were before the Court. Answering the legal chal-
lenge, the Court found: "The broad language of [the act] plainly allows the Secretary's 
construction of the statute." /d. at ---· As to the legislative history argument, it said: 
"When we find, as we do here, that the legislative history is ambiguous and unenlightening 
on the matters with respect to which the regulations deal, we customarily defer to the expertise 
of the agency." /d. at ___ (emphasis added). Thus, it held that "[t]he Secretary's regula-
tions are a permissible construction of [the act] ... . "!d. at---· 
158. This confusion is reminiscent of that caused by Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 
U.S. 136 (1967), two decades ago. Both had language which suggested that review, either 
reviewability in Abbott or standards of review in Chevron, must be based on the clear language 
in the statute but did not seem to affirmatively deny the search for law elsewhere. 
159. The Supreme Court seems to be struggling to control the extreme readings of Chev-
ron while maintaining the vitality of the law/policy distinction. NLRB v. United Food & 
Commercial Workers Union, 108 S. Ct. 413 (1987); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207 
(1987). 
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ally follow this approach. 160 Thus Justice Marshall applied no "Chevron two 
step" in Curtin Matheson; he merely held the Board's decision "consistent 
with the Act"-end of analysis. 161 
VI. REVIEW OF PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
Justice Blackmun's separate dissenting opinion in Curtin Matheson suggests 
yet another review strategy. 162 He observed: 
Rarely will a court feel so certain of the wrongness of an agency's empirical 
judgment that it will be justified in substituting its own view of the facts. But 
courts can and should review agency decisionmaking closely to ensure that an 
agency has adequately explained the bases for its conclusions, that the various 
components of its policy form an internally consistent whole, and that any appar-
ent contradictions are acknowledged and addressed. This emphasis upon the 
decisionmaking process allows the reviewing court to exercise meaningful control 
over unelected officials without second-guessing the sort of expert judgments 
that a court may be ill-equipped to make. Such an approach also affords the 
agency a broad range of discretion. 163 
He would then have a reviewing court concern itself primarily with the 
adequacy of the procedures. 164 This strategy is both too restrained and too 
liberated. By using procedure, courts may arrogate power over substance. 165 
Or by limiting review to procedural questions, the courts may avoid the 
important, if restrained, review of substantive issues. Thus reviewing courts' 
authority over procedural questions affect both the procedural and the 
substantive review roles. 
The "well-established principles of administrative law" dictate that courts 
should dominate procedural questions because these issues are similar, or 
the same as, issues of law. 166 Courts are free to substitute judgment on 
160. The issue becomes, then, whether the role of the court in dealing with a less than 
explicit legislative command should change simply because an administrative agency is in 
the picture. Certainly, from the standpoint of constitutional regularity, nothing would indi-
cate such an inclination. One may start with the point that the courts were explicitly 
contemplated by the Framers, while the agencies were not, or were much less, the objects 
of their consideration. Since statutory construction is assigned to the judicial branch by 
the Constitution, advocates of change in that allocation should at least bear the burden of 
persuasion. 
Hirshman, Postmodernjurisprudence and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 82 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 646, 669 ( 1988) (footnotes omitted). 
161. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc. 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1549 (1990). 
162. !d. at 1555 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
163. !d. at 1556 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
164. Without using the term,Justice Blackmun may be adopting the "hard look" doctrine, 
which requires a court to assure that the agency took a hard look at the questions. See supra 
note I 06 and accompanying text. 
165. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1312-14 (1975). 
166. Preclusion of question of law precludes review of procedures. Gott v. Walters, 791 
F.2d 172 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (en bane); see Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602,615 
( 1984) (Under the Medicare Act's preclusion provision, 42 U .S.C. § 405(h), procedural chal-
lenges are subsumed within a claim "arising under" a preclusion statute.). 
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procedural choices with which they do not agree. judicial dominance is based 
on the fact that judges are experts in procedures. Indeed, their procedural 
expertise is paramount and the agency's expertise cannot stand up to it even 
though the agency is deeply concerned with its own procedures. 
On the other hand, the law recognizes that an agency's method of 
proceeding is a central concern of that agency. Agencies are experts in their 
own procedural requirements and agencies are concerned directly with the 
success of their procedures. Courts see only a distorted sample of the results 
of those procedures and may not recognize their overall success. Also,judges 
tend to evaluate procedural questions according to the dictates of tradition; 
the agencies, however, are under some practical pressure to innovate. 
In response to these considerations, the law has instructed the courts to 
give "great deference" to the agencies; 167 the law has created a rather strong 
presumption of regularity. Courts sometimes believe the law binds them to 
the procedural judgment of the agency much as in agency dominated 
issues 168 but this overstates the restraint. There is little question of judicial 
authority to do agreement review; the agency's procedures must comply 
with the law and the courts must assure that it does. 169 However, the courts 
themselves must obey the law and, despite their unmistakable expertise, are 
not free agents in designing procedures. 
The leading case, Vermont Yankee, 170 makes this clear. Vermont Yankee 
involved judicial authority to add procedures to informal rulemaking. After 
a hearing, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) granted petitioners a 
license to operate a nuclear power plant. The AEC subsequently instituted 
rulemaking proceedings to deal with special environmental effects and 
eventually issued a rule about nuclear fuel cycles. Respondents appealed 
the fuel cycle rule and the decision to grant a license. The D.C. Circuit held 
that the basic notice and comment rulemaking prescribed by APA section 
553 was a statutory minimum and in this situation that minimum procedure 
was inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed. 
Some contend that the Supreme Court's opinion in Vermont Yankee 
reversed the long-standing judicial dominance over procedural questions. 171 
Yet the Court held no more than that courts are not authorized to impose 
procedures in addition to those prescribed by the F APA. 172 True, the opin-
ion contained language which severely restricts judicial authority to develop 
167. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) ("In assessing what process is due in 
this case, substantial weight must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals 
charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs that the procedures 
they have provided assure fair consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals."). 
168. FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279,290-91 (1965). 
169. The FAPA expressly provides for such review. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D). While once 
again the Act fails to describe the depth of the review it was intended to be what I call 
agreement review. 
170. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 
U.S. 519 (1978), on remand, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983). 
171. Levin, supra note 2, at 60. 
172. 435 U.S. at 524. 
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administrative procedures, but such language does not contradict the notion 
that the reviewing courts can substitute judgment on procedural questions. 
The opinion only makes the self-evident finding that courts, although 
free to substitute judgment on questions of law, including procedural law, 
are not free to misapply the law. The Supreme Court found the lower court 
in Vermont Yankee misinterpreted the law so the Court rejected the lower 
court's judgment. Read closely this case, as does Chevron discussed above, 
stands for the rather unextraordinary proposition that courts must obey the 
law themselves. 173 
Judicial dominance over procedural questions similarly was restrained in 
Steadman v. SEC. 174 Steadman involved the standard of proof in fraud cases 
brought in SEC administrative proceedings. 175 The F APA required the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard in agency adjudications, but 
lower courts had ordered the SEC to use a higher standard of proof in fraud 
cases. 176 The Court read the F APA as mandating a preponderance of the 
evidence standard and held that lower courts lacked the authority to impose 
a higher standard of proof. However, the Court said that had there been 
no congressionally created standard, as .in a prior case, 177 the lower court 
would have been free to impose whatever standard it felt was fair and to 
substitute judgment on this procedural question. 178 The Supreme Court 
held, however, that the law did not permit the lower court this freedom 
where the statutory language was clear. 179 
Like other law questions, there are limits on procedural review and an 
issue-driven strategy might continue these limits. The court should review 
the agency's procedural judgment at three different levels. First and fore-
most, the court should assure that the agency procedures comply with stat-
utory requirements, both the specific enabling act and the general law 
created by the F APA. Second, the court must assure that the procedures 
comply with constitutional requirements, particularly due process. Third, 
the court must ultimately make its own judgment that the procedures create 
fundamental fairness. 
The first test in procedural review is, of course, the relevant statute. A 
reviewing court must assure that the agency procedures comply with the 
relevant statute or congressional intent. After such review, however, it may 
be that the Vermont Yankee/Steadman line of cases requires that the courts 
themselves stick very closely to the legislation. 
This law restricts innovation by the courts but perhaps it could encourage 
innovation by the agencies. Under these cases, the agencies are given some 
173. See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369,2373 (1988) (making 
the same point with respect to court supervision of grand jury investigations). 
174. 450 u.s. 91 (1981). 
175. /d. at 92. 
176. E.g., Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
177. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276,284 (1966). 
178. 450 U.S. at 95. 
179. /d. 
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freedom from stifling judicial review. Unfortunately, agencies are not as 
inclined as they might be to experiment with procedures. One review strat-
egy permitted under Vermont Yankee would be to encourage the agency to 
engage in innovation. 
Regardless, the courts have a continuing duty to test administrative action 
against the Constitution. The procedures for many administrative decisions 
are not covered by statute, particularly those used for informal adjudica-
tion. Where the statute is not clear, the due process test for procedural 
decision becomes the dominant source of procedural law. Since the courts 
have plenary authority over constitutional law, the courts are very domi-
nant here. 
However, the due process authority over procedural questions is much 
more substantial than that. Although somewhat inconsistent with the tone 
of Vermont Yankee and Steadman, the Supreme Court has established that 
due process determinations are dominant even over statutory procedures. 
In Arnett v. Kennedy, 180 Justice Rehnquist suggested the "bitter with the 
sweet" doctrine. 181 This doctrine would limit due process analysis in much 
the same way as Vermont Yankee limits the courts in other regards. It would 
create per se compliance with due process where the statute that established 
the entitlement to a right also set the procedures for vindication of that 
right. 182 The Supreme Court in Loudermill' 83 expressly rejected this doctrine. 
Therefore, even where the agency follows procedures set by statute, the 
court must make an independent judgment as to whether those procedures 
comply with due process. In other words, at least at the due process level, 
the Vermont Yankee line of cases has no force. 
The third possible procedural review is whether the procedures violate 
the court's sense of fundamental fairness. Recent Supreme Court decisions 
such as Vermont Yankee seem to limit the court's ability to free-lance in this 
way. Somewhere between due process and interpretation of the statutory 
requirement, Vermont Yankee, however, may still have left some authority 
in the courts to review procedures that violate fundamental fairness. One 
clear example of this gap would be where the statute neither establishes the 
procedure nor gives the agency the authority to do so. 184 Here, even under 
Vermont Yankee, the court need not look to the Constitution or due process 
alone to find authority to closely scrutinize procedures for fairness. 
Although not as restrictive as some contend, Vermont Yankee does confine 
judicial review of procedural issues. Here the issue-driven strategy serves 
the purpose of opening the debate over the advisability of judicial inter-
vention in procedural questions. Where Congress has in fact intentionally 
set the procedures, a court should treat that decision with the same respect 
180. 416 u.s. 134 (1974). 
181. /d. at 152-54. 
182. /d. 
183. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1985). 
184. 450 U.S. at 95. 
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the judiciary is to accord other legislative judgments. However, where the 
agency sets the procedures, courts should be free to apply their special 
procedural expertise to those administrative judgments. If they object to 
the agency's procedural judgment, they should take care to justify their 
intervention and they should accord the agency's procedural judgment the 
traditional great deference. Many judges have an unfortunate predisposi-
tion towards increasing procedures and this predisposition must be 
tempered. 185 Nonetheless, conceding the advantages of deference and judi-
cial restraint, courts should have an active role as to procedural law. 
I would hope then that the issue-driven strategy might change the nature 
of the debate. It might temper some of the confrontational aspects and lead 
the courts and the agencies to work in concert to develop procedural inno-
vations for particular administrative programs. This cooperation is possible 
even under current law but the law might allow the courts more freedom 
in order to take full advantage of their substantial procedural expertise. 
VII. REVIEW OF DISCRETION 
The last element of an issue-driven review strategy is the designation of 
the judicial role with respect to administrative discretion. In Curtin Mathe-
son, the majority summarized: "We hold that the Board acted within its 
discretion in refusing to adopt a presumption of replacement opposition to 
the union .... " 186 The tone of this statement suggests that the Court 
believed it had little, if any, authority over the valid exercise of adminis-
trative discretion. 
However, "discretion" is a slippery, although vital, term in administrative 
law. 187 Indeed, administrative law uses the term in a variety of different 
senses, each suggesting different review strategies. 1 88 In a general sense, 
discretion connotes a sense of both authority and decision making freedom. 
Thus, to determine the judicial role with respect to issues resolved by the 
exercise of administrative discretion, the review system must be sensitive to 
the different types of authority and the various levels of decisionmaking 
freedom. 
185. S. BREYER, supra note 48, at 34 7 ("Critics of procedural expansion are "uncertain 
whether the more elaborate procedures have changed substantive results or have led to more 
accurate decision making."). 
186. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 1542, 1544 (1990). 
18 7. The classic legal theory description of discretion was provided by Hart and Sacks. 
For them, discretion is "the power to choose between two or more courses of action each of 
which is thought of as permissible." H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCF.SS: BASIC 
PROBLF.MS IN THF. MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 162 (1958). In the administrative law 
context, this definition is inconsequential. Even under the substantial evidence test an agency 
decision must be accepted if the court finds that the agency chose one among several accept-
able positions. I KocH Surr., supra note 2, at 34. 
188. I have observed five distinct uses of the term: three designating decision making that 
is subjected to different levels of review and two designating unreviewable administrative 
decisionmaking. Koch, supra note 137, at 470-71. 
546 43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 511 
Administrative law has been evolving such a system. Conscious and orderly 
application of the principles being developed will provide the necessary 
judicial sensitivity to the distinct judicial role with respect to each sense of 
the term. The first level distinction is between discretion subject to some 
review and that made unreviewable. 
Reviewable discretion 
The current law has evolved several strategies with respect to reviewable 
discretion under the single word formula "abuse of discretion." 189 As with 
the other issue-oriented approaches, this strategy has evolved because courts 
recognize instinctively the different senses of authority and decision making 
freedom at work in the exercise of discretion before them rather than a 
formalistic application of the "abuse of discretion" word formula. In 
conducting abuse of discretion review, courts consider the nature of the 
relevant grant of discretion and then the meaning of the term "abuse" in 
the context of that type of discretion. 
The existence of discretion creates a tension between the authority of the 
courts and that of the agency exercising the discretion. Where the discre-
tion is reviewable, that review must vary in accordance with the nature of 
the authority intended in the grant of discretion. A reviewing court must 
strive to recognize the appropriate administrative authority in order to 
implement the intended allocation of decisionmaking responsibility. 
Several factors justify measuring review according to the authority impli-
cated in the grant of administrative discretion. Administrative systems that 
employ discretion are designed with the agencies, not the courts, having 
the primary decisionmaking responsibility. The grant of discretion is usually 
related to agency expertise, including specialized knowledge and experi-
ence. Although the courts may make informed judgments about many of 
these issues, the agencies often have a comparative advantage. The compar-
ative advantage, however, differs among programs. Thus, the extent to 
which the agency authority is to be dominant over the judicial authority 
varies among such programs. The nature of the discretion conveys the allo-
cation of authority. 190 
189. This word formula appears in the FAPA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
190. In light of the different senses of authority conveyed by the term, I have suggested 
that the abuse of discretion word formula requires a different review strategy for each of 
the three reviewable senses of discretion I have observed. 2 KocH, SUPP., supra note 2, at 
§ 9.7. 
We have already confronted one major use of the term: the authority and freedom to make 
policy. Justice Marshall in Curtin Matheson used the term in this sense. As suggested in that 
opinion, courts have the authority to review administrative policymaking but that authority 
is very limited. As discussed above, this limited judicial authority over policymaking is more 
often communicated through the arbitrariness standard than the abuse of discretion stan-
dard. No matter the word formula, very restrained review is well established. 
Administrative law also uses the term discretion to describe a narrower authority and free-
dom: the discretion to fill in the gaps in legislation. I have labeled this sense of discretion as 
"executing discretion." Executing discretion is quite different from policymaking even though 
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The determination of what constitutes "abuse" recognizes the decision-
making freedom conveyed by the grant of discretion. The term commu-
nicates a very limited role for the reviewing courts. Abuse, like arbitrariness, 
suggests that the courts are to interfere only if they find the administrative 
decisionmaking to be particularly egregious. Indeed, in this sense the two 
standards are roughly equivalent. 191 Abuse, as does arbitrariness, instructs 
reviewing courts to tolerate a relatively high risk of error. Thereby, the 
abuse standard preserves the administrative discretion while assigning to 
the courts responsibility for preventing intolerable exercises of such 
discretion. 
Unreviewable discretion 
Agency authority and decisionmaking freedom over certain issues may 
be so extensive that the courts may have no residual authority (although 
some other institution might) and hence resolution of those issues may be 
unreviewable. Here, it is particularly important to remember that a given 
administrative decision incorporates the resolution of a bundle of issues. 
Some of the issues in the decision may be reviewable while others are not. 
The entire decision will be unreviewable only if none of the controverted 
issues resolved by the decision are reviewable. 192 For example, Veterans 
Administration decisions were expressly unreviewable but the Supreme 
Court ruled that controverted constitutionality issues contained in those 
decisions were still reviewable. 193 Later, Congress provided for review of 
they both relate to incomplete legislation. Policymaking is not merely the power to extend 
legislation or fill in detail; rather, policymaking is the authority to define the path by which 
the legislative goals are to be attained. In the exercise of executing discretion, the agency 
merely follows a path defined by the legislation. A reviewing court can evaluate the exercise 
of this type of authority more intensely than it can policymaking because the court can test 
these implementing judgments against the narrow confines of the legislative prescription. 
Judicial authority here could be quite extensive. 
The most prevalent sense of discretion is quite different from the other two reviewable 
senses of the term. It implicates administrative authority to engage in individual decision-
making, and hence I have labeled this as "individualizing discretion." Agencies may have 
express or inherent authority to make adjustments in the way they apply statutory standards 
or administrative rules in individual situations. Commentators have long recognized this sense 
of discretion. E.g., K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY jUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1969) 
("Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individualization of justice .... Rules alone, untem-
pered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern government and of modern 
justice."); j. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC jUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
CLAIMS I 07 (1983) ("Rulemaking necessarily constrains sensitive exercise of individualized 
discretion."). Individualizing discretion allows the process to be sensitive, fair and efficient; 
hence a reviewing court should approach this type of discretion with a positive attitude. 
Because most courts already recognize the positive aspects of such discretion, they rarely 
undertake extensive review unless they find the particular exercise of such individualizing 
discretion well beyond the range of plausible deviations from the standard or rule. 
191. As the Restatement of Scope-of-Review Doctrine by the ABA Section of Adminis-
trative Law found: "No distinctions are drawn among the terms 'arbitrary, capricious, [or] 
an abuse of discretion' in § 706(2)(A)." Levin, supra note 63, at 292. 
192. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602,614 (1984) (Any claim "inextricably intertwined" 
with an unreviewable claim will also be unreviewable.). 
193. johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974). 
548 43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 511 
these veterans' benefits decisions but it retained unreviewability for ques-
tions of fact. 194 
Often, the unreviewability of an issue is conveyed by the term "discre-
tion." Still, not all discretion is unreviewable. Further inquiry is necessary 
to determine whether the particular issue involves one of the term's two 
unreviewable senses. Discretion may refer to an issue made unreviewable 
by statute or other law. The term may also cover the administrative reso-
lution of issues which are inherently unsuitable for review. 
(a) Unbridled discretion. The first category of unreviewability defines 
administrative decisions that the empowering authority or existing law has 
shielded from judicial scrutiny. There is no universal justification to support 
completely removing these issues from review. Nothing inherent in the kinds 
of issues made unreviewable suggests that courts could not perform some 
useful function. Usually it seems that the reasons for unreviewability are 
either to avoid any judicial interference or to cut the cost of the program. 195 
Still, some review, albeit limited, does not seem clearly inappropriate even 
for these reasons. Yet the political authority or tradition, for some reason, 
deemed it advisable to give the agency the final word and created a sense 
of the term "discretion" conveying unreviewability. 196 
To use the terminology of the FAPA, this unreviewability can be created 
either by statute 197 or "by law." 198 Both state and federal administrative law 
recognize that either a statute or the common law might prevent judicial 
intervention in the administrative determination as to certain issues. Because 
the federal act incorporates both, it is useful to discuss the law as it has been 
applied by federal courts. 
The first provision, section 701 (a)( 1 ), merely incorporates any enabling 
act that expressly precludes review. Interpretation of the provision has not 
caused much trouble. The pendulum has swung back and forth between 
the Abbott199 doctrine requiring the unreviewability within the statutory 
language and the acceptance of other evidence of legislative intent to make 
194. 2 KOCH SUPP., supra note 2, at 130-31. 
195. For example, according to the Supreme Court, the purpose of unreviewability in the 
provision covering the Veterans' Administration, 38 U .S.C. § 211 (a) is the technical nature 
of the decisions and administrative and judicial costs. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 370 
(1974); see also Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 106 S. Ct. 2133, 2139-
40 ( 1986). Congress may have also precluded judicial review to eliminate any sense of adver-
sariness between the government and veterans. Note, The Case for judicial Review of Veterans' 
Administration Benefit Determinations, 2 AUMIN. L.J. 217, 235-36 (1988). 
196. Dworkin, The Model Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14 (1967), reprinted in R. DwoRKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32 (1977) ("Sometimes we use the term [discretion] in a ... weak 
sense, to say only that some official has final au,thority to make a decision and cannot be 
reviewed and reversed by any other official."). 
197. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(l) (Review provided "except to the extent that- (I) statutes preclude 
judicial review"). 
198. 5 U .S.C. § 70 I (a)(2) (Review provided "except to the extent that- (2) agency action 
is committed to agency discretion by law"). 
199. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967). 
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the decision unreviewable. 200 At present the latter seems to be the law. 201 
The second provision, section 701 (a)(2), has caused more definitional 
problems. Interpretation of this provision involves an analysis of the type 
of "discretion" covered and of the type of "law" which can create such 
unreviewable discretion. The major source of confusion is the phrase "by 
law" and that vague phrase has caused problems for generations. What "law" 
does the provision include? Since subsection (a)( 1) expressly covers all 
unreviewability expressly provided by statute, subsection (a)(2) must cover 
some other sources of unreviewability. This law must be that created by 
the grant of preemptive administrative authority and decisionmaking free-
dom in the statutory scheme, the common law evolution, or the 
Constitution. 202 
One type of "law" that might create unreviewable discretion is statutory 
law. As recognized by subsection (a)(l), a statute might expressly preclude 
review. However, a statute may also imply unreviewability, as recognized 
by subsection (a)(2), by granting the full decisionmaking authority to the 
agency. The famous Overton Park opinion described the nature of this source 
of unreviewable discretion. 203 
In Overton Park, a public interest group challenged the Secretary of Tran-
sportation's decision to authorize the use of federal funds to finance the 
construction of a highway through a Memphis park. The Court was 
compelled to engage in an in-depth analysis of its role in such informal 
decisionmaking. It ultimately concluded that the proper judicial role was 
the very restrained arbitrariness standard. Nonetheless, it first asked whether 
the decision was reviewable at all. Since the statute did not expressly preclude 
review, the remaining basis for unreviewability was the nature of the discre-
tion. Based in part on the legislative history of the F APA, 204 the Court found 
that unreviewable "absolute discretion" existed when the statute left the 
courts "no law to apply," that is, the statute lacked meaningful standards 
whereby a reviewing court might evaluate the agency's exercise of discre-
200. 2 KOCH SUPP., supra note 2, at § 9.32. 
201. Compare Block v. Community Nutrition lnst., 467 U.S. 340,351 (1984) (Review can 
be precluded by specific language or specific legislative intent that is " 'fairly discernible' in 
the detail of the legislative scheme.") and United States v. Fausto, 108 S. Ct. 668, 675-76 
(1988) with Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, I 06 S. Ct. 2133, 2139 (1986). 
202. Although the only member of the Court to recognize the breadth of the term "law" 
as used in § 70 I (a)(2), Justice Scalia confused the point by relying heavily on statutory inter-
pretation to find the "common law." Webster v. Doe, I 08 S. Ct. 204 7, 2055-63 ( 1988) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). The boundary between statutory interpretation and evolved law is indeed 
sometimes murky, but justice Scalia's resolution conceptually puts him in a curious position 
vis-a-vis judicial activism. If statutory interpretation is common law then is it not in the domain 
of the judiciary? 
203. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410 (1971). 
204. S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945), reprinted in LEGISLATI\'E HISTORY 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 212 (1946) ("If, for example, statutes are drawn 
in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply, courts of course have no 
statutory question to review."). 
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tion. 205 This analysis established a fairly straightforward and often cited test 
for determining whether Congress had so committed the decision to the 
agency's authority as to preclude all judicial involvement. 206 
But statutory law is not the only "law" that might create absolute, and 
hence unreviewable, discretion. Another "law" that might create unreview-
able discretion is the "common law" or traditional principles. This law is 
judge-made but is nonetheless very strongly rooted in our system. 207 
Traditional or common law, for example, has evolved unreviewability for 
the exercise of "prosecutorial" discretion. The Supreme Court's Heckler v. 
Chaney opinion demonstrates the persistence of the tradition of unreview-
able prosecutorial discretion. 208 The case arose in a bizarre factual setting 
but the nature of the administrative action offered the opportunity for a 
concept of modest review of the initiation-type decisions covered by the 
concept of prosecutorial discretion. Prison inmates brought actions to compel 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take enforcement action against 
the use of lethal injections to carry out the death penalty, arguing that the 
drugs used were not approved by the FDA for human executions. The issue 
was whether the decision not to act against this drug use was committed to 
agency discretion in a way that precluded review.209 The district court, the 
circuit court, and the Supreme Court all began with the test for reviewa-
bility in Overton Park, which is whether a meaningful standard exists by 
which to evaluate the agency's decision. 210 Applying this test, the Court in 
Heckler found no controlling standard and hence held that the FDA's deci-
sion was unreviewable. However, the statute provided a meaningful stan-
dard thatjudges could apply. 211 The real basis of the opinion was the well-
205. HOUSE COMM. ON THE jUDICIARY, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., APP. TO Arr'y GEN. 
STATEMENT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT 413-14 (1946). 
206. Although well established, this concept may run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine. 
Doesn't delegation without meaningful standards create a per se violation of the nondele-
gation doctrine, even in its weak modern version? While that question is beyond the scope 
of this article, the answer may lie in this article's foundational concept that administrative 
decisions result from the resolution of a bundle of issues. Thus, although an issue, even a 
crucial issue, may be left to the agency's unbridled discretion, still the decisionmaking itself 
will be sufficiently retained to survive the nondelegation doctrine. 
207. NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers' Union, 108 S. Ct. 413,422 (1987) 
(reading preclusion of review of settlement decisions into the NLRB as an exercise of pros-
ecutorial discretion.). 
208. 470 u.s. 821 (1985). 
209. /d. at 823. 
210. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,410-13 (1971). 
211. While it is true that, as Justice Rehnquist points out, nothing in the statute compels 
the Secretary to bring a case, the sections cited by the Court itself contain meaningful stan-
dards. 4 70 U.S. at 835-37. The injunction section, 21 U .S.C. § 332, refers to a section listing 
"prohibited acts" (21 U .S.C. § 331 ), and the seizure section, 21 U .S.C. § 334, creates liability 
for "adulterated or misbranded" goods (as the Court recognized § 352 further defines 
misbranded). These are standards that the Court regularly finds meaningful and applies. In 
short, there was sufficient "law to apply" and hence the Court had the capacity to review in 
accordance with these standards but for the traditional acceptance of unbridled prosecutorial 
discretion. 
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established principle against review of prosecutorial discretion. 
The Court started with the presumption that a decision not to act involved 
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion. 212 This unreviewability, it found, 
evolved into a well-established doctrine that was not changed by the 
F APA. 213 As Justice Rehnquist stated: "For good reasons, such a decision 
[whether to bring enforcement action or not] has traditionally been 
'committed to agency discretion,' and we believe that the Congress enacting 
the AP A did not intend to alter that tradition. (APA did not significantly 
alter the 'common law' of judicial review of agency action.)" 214 Thus, the 
Court actually based its finding of unreviewability on tradition and not on 
the absence of standards. 
The law that makes prosecutorial discretion unreviewable has evolved 
over time and that law is judge-made common law. What judges have made 
they can unmake if they have sound reason for doing so. 215 It is true that 
often the relevant prosecutorial decisions involve the necessary and bene-
ficial discretion to individualize in order to allow the system to do individual 
justice. While this might justify some limits on review of this individualizing 
discretion, it does not justify complete unreviewability. Prosecutors and other 
law enforcement officials should not be inflexible even where the law is 
clear, but their decisions need not be unreviewable. In most other countries 
prosecutors' decisions are in fact reviewable. 216 Despite significant arguments 
against unbridled prosecutorial discretion,217 however, the view persists that 
our system cannot permit review. 
Tradition as the basis for unreviewability was also the actual concept at 
work in the more recent Webster v. Doe opinion. 218 The majority held that 
a CIA termination decision was so committed to agency discretion as to 
preclude review, except for serious constitutional questions. 219 Justice Scalia, 
dissenting, found constitutional questions precluded as well. He agreed with 
the assertion made above that the "no law to apply" test does not describe 
212. As I have noted previously, there is a natural distinction between a decision not to 
act and mere delay. 2 KOCH SUPP., supra note 2, at § 9.21. In at least some types of cases, 
review of decisions not to act is practical. 
213. 470 U.S. at 831-32. 
214. /d. at 832 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
215. Even Chaney may not support an extreme view of prosecutorial discretion. Sunstein, 
Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 675 (1985) ("It 
would probably be a mistake to read Chaney as establishing a general rule of nonreviewability 
for enforcement decisions. The opinion is filled with more than the usual number of disclaim-
ers."). See also Note, The Scope of Review of Agencies' Refusals to Enforce or Promulgate Rules, 53 
CEO. WASH. L. REV. 86, 104, 117 (1984-85). 
216. E.g., Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 439, 
463-66 (1974). 
217. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560,568-74 (1975). 
218. 108 S. Ct. 2047 (1988). 
219. /d. at 2053. 
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the full reach of section 701 (a)(2) preclusion220 and he recognized that the 
"law" that precludes review may be common law. 221 This common law, he 
observed, constitutes "a body of jurisprudence that had marked out, with 
more or less precision, certain issues and certain areas that were beyond 
the range of judicial review." 222 The personnel decision at issue in Webster, 
like prosecutorial decisions, was traditionally unreviewable. 
Having recognized the common law genesis of the relevant discretion, 
Justice Scalia articulated theoretical support for a contraction of unreview-
ability "by law. " 223 Unfortunately, Justice Scalia never confronted the ques-
tion as to whether judges could change this common law. 224 
The third type of "law" that creates unreviewable discretion is the 
Constitution. For example, the conduct of military or foreign affairs is 
unreviewable by constitutional "law."225 In Webster, for example, Justice 
Scalia could rely not only on the common law but also the Constitution. 
Such decisions differ from traditionally unreviewable discretion in that 
the "law" making it unreviewable has some constitutional base. 226 There is 
a very strong separation of powers argument that supports the conclusion 
that such decisions are entirely within the constitutional powers of the exec-
utive and the judicial branch is precluded from involving itself in them. 
Unlike the common law source of unreviewability, constitutionally based 
unreviewability is unassailable directly. When the "law" that creates the 
unreviewable discretion is founded on constitutional principles then changes 
in that law may be beyond the power of the judicial branch. 
220. /d. at 2056 ( 1988) (Scalia, J ., dissenting) ("The 'no law to apply' test can account for 
the nonreviewability of certain issues, but falls far short of explaining the full scope of the 
areas from which the courts are excluded [by§ 701(a)(2)]."). "The Court could clarify its 
analysis by explicitly acknowledging what it is already doing implicitly: it should cease treating 
the 'law to apply' test as the exclusive standard for identifying actions that are 'committed 
to agency discretion.' " Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law, 74 MINN. 
L. REv.689,734(1990). 
221. I 08 S. Ct. at 2056 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
222. /d. 
223. Regardless, both Chaney and Webster make reversal of this law unlikely in the fore-
seeable future. The "law" of prosecutorial discretion will continue to give the agencies extreme 
dominance over decisions within that category. The position here is that Chaney's extreme 
position is unnecessary. Some see it as an incorrect reading of the law. Davis, "No Law to 
Apply," 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. I, II (1988) ("Even if a reviewing court takes the position 
that it has no law to apply, it normally can and should exercise judicial discretion in deciding 
whether the agency has abused its discretion.") (emphasis in original). 
224. "The Supreme Court should acknowledge the common law role that it, in any event, 
obviously feels impelled to play. It could do so by replacing the formalistic Overton Park 
analysis with a pragmatic approach to section 70 I (a)(2)." Levin, supra note 219, at 741. Safer-
stein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of"Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. 
REv. 367 ( 1968) offered some useful considerations for determining whether unreviewability 
should continue. 
225. E.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. 
denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1975) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 954 ( 1976). 
226. In our early constitutional history, there was no acceptance of absolute prosecutorial 
discretion. See Heckler v. Chaney, I 05 S. Ct. 1649, 1663-65 (1985) (Marshall,J., concurring). 
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Justice Scalia severely criticized the majority for leaving this door open: 
In sum, it is simply untenable that there must be a judicial remedy for every 
constitutional violation. Members of Congress and the supervising officers of 
the Executive Branch take the same oath to uphold the Constitution that we do, 
and sometimes they are left to perform that oath unreviewed, as we always are. 227 
Justice Scalia further admonished the Court: 
The harm done by today's decision is that, contrary to what Congress knows is 
preferable, it brings a significant decisionmaking process of our intelligence 
services into a forum where it does not belong. Neither the Constitution, nor 
our laws, nor common sense gives an individual a right to come into court to 
litigate the reasons for his dismissal as an intelligence agent. It is of course not 
just valid constitutional claims that today's decision makes the basis for judicial 
review ... but all colorable constitutional claims, whether meritorious or not. ... 
Today's result ... will have ramifications far beyond creation of the world's 
only secret intelligence agency that must litigate the dismissal of its agents. If 
constitutional claims can be raised in this highly sensitive context, it is hard to 
imagine where they cannot. The assumption that there are any executive deci-
sions that cannot be hauled into the courts may no longer be valid. Also obsolete 
may be the assumption that we are capable of preserving a sensible common law 
of judicial review. 228 
This then becomes the domain of conflicting theories of constitutional 
interpretation. If one sees the courts' power as severely limited then any 
unreviewability grounded in the Constitution will rarely be changed. 229 
Nonetheless, within the confines of proper constitutional interpretation, 
courts may still have some room to narrow the scope of unreviewable 
discretion. 230 
(b) Inherently unreviewable discretion. In administrative decisionmaking, 
there is a second category of unreviewable discretion: issues that are by 
nature unsuitable for review. 231 We use the word discretion to identify this 
type of issue and use of the term here differs from all other forms of discre-
tion. Indeed, it differs from any other form of decisionmaking. It is unique 
because it cannot be tested according to any sense of error or even prob-
ability of error. The process for resolving this form of discretion appears 
more like intuition than judgment. Many have noted similar issues in other 
227. I 08 S. Ct. at 2059 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
228. /d. at 2062-63. 
229. The Webster majority suggests also that Congress may limit the courts' constitutional 
review. /d. at 2053. 
230. See INS v. Abudu, I 08 S. Ct. 904, 912-15 (1988) (subjecting a foreign affairs related 
decision to abuse of discretion review); 2 KOCH SUPP., supra note 2, at 135-36. 
231. In a mischievous moment, I labeled such decisionmaking as "numinous discretion." 
Koch, supra note 137, at 502. 
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legal decisionmaking232 but such issues seem particularly important in the 
administrative process. 
Jurisprudential literature tends to refer to it as the "strong sense" of 
discretion or it could be called "pure" discretion. 233 For such decisionmak-
ing, any standard that might be found or derived from the grant of author-
ity only guides the decisionmaking; it cannot control its exercise. In making 
such decisions, the official, as Dworkin observed, "can be criticized, but not 
for being disobedient."234 Dworkin urged that judges do not have this type 
of discretion but, even accepting this conclusion,235 his observation does not 
deny the possible existence of such discretion in the hands of at least some 
administrative decisionmakers. 
Justice O'Connor conceded that such discretion does exist in the admin-
istrative process. 236 She observed: "Some decisions, in short, may turn more 
on experience and intuition than on any listing of reasons, factors, stan-
dards, or the like. " 237 Others have wrestled with the indisputable existence 
of "unknowable" elements in administrative decisions238 and have observed 
this form of administrative decisionmaking. 239 
Jaffe observed this form of administrative decision making which he also 
232. DwORKIN, supra note 195, at 31-39 (distinguishing the "strong" sense of discretion 
from other uses of the term); Rosenberg, judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from 
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971) (distinguishing primary and secondary discre-
tion); see also Greenawalt, Discretion and judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that 
Bind judges, 7 5 COLUM. L. REV. 359 ( 1975); Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 
747. 
233. Dworkin has explained the meaning of this strong sense of the term: 
Sometimes we use "discretion" in a weak sense, simply to say that for some reason the 
standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but demand the use of 
judgment .... 
. . . We use "discretion" sometimes not merely to say that an 'official must use judgment 
in applying the standards set [fori him by authority, or that no one will review that exercise 
of judgment, but to say that on some issue he is simply not bound by standards set by the 
authority in question .... 
. . . An official's discretion means not that he is free to decide without recourse to stan-
dards of sense and fairness, but only that his decision is not controlled by a standard furnished 
by the particular authority we have in mind when we raise the question of discretion. Of 
course this latter sort of freedom is important; that is why we have the strong sense of 
discretion. Someone who has discretion in this [strong] sense can be criticized, but not for 
being disobedient. ... 
Dworkin, supra note 195, at 31-33. 
234. /d. at 33. 
235. Dworkin's view challenges the positivist approach. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 
138-44 (1961). It continues to be a controversial issue. E.g., Greenawalt, supra note 231, at 
366-68; MacCormick, Discretion and Rights, 8 LAW & PHIL. 23, 35-36 (1989); Waluchow, 
Strong Discretion, 33 THE PHIL. Q. 321 (1983). 
236. O'Connor, Reflections on Preclusion of judicial Review in England and the United States, 
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643, 654-55 (1986). 
237. /d. at 655. She cited an oriental parable quoted in my treatise (2 KOCH, supra note 
2, at 147 n.7) that suggests the practical necessity of such decisionmaking. 
238. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO, & P. VERKUIL, supra note 34, at § 7 .3.4. 
239. J. MASHAW, supra note 189, at 67 (described as "clinical intelligence" involving "the 
feel or craft of decisionmakers"). 
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called discretion. 240 He recognized that review of those decisions he included 
under the term "discretion" involves a variety of different functions based 
on the fundamental existence of "a purported application of the statutory 
grants of power to the facts as found. " 241 He separated these grants accord-
ing to the three types of "rules" they might create. 242 Two of these three 
types involve decisionmaking where the application of facts is conclusive. 
In contrast, the third type of decisionmaking is entirely different in char-
acter: the authorization merely suggests what type o( facts are relevant but 
does not make them conclusive.243 
The essence of such decision making is that knowable factors pass through 
the appropriate administrative process towards a decision. Jaffe explained 
that this type of discretion 
compels the administrator to resort to a whole complex of additional concepts 
and attitudes, official and personal, ... some of which he may not express, some 
of which he may be unaware of .... The mind focuses attention for a period of 
time on a group of authoritative decisional factors. But ultimately it reaches 
decision by an intuitive leap. 244 
The bureaucratic process here then can be understood in terms of an intu-
itive mental process. 245 
Intuition is knowing without conscious reasoning; it is the ability of the 
subconscious mind to synthesize variables in a more complex way than can 
the conscious mind. 246 In some cases, we seem to make better decisions 
through such mental processes than we make through more rational proc-
esses.247 For example, if asked to select drapes, we would do better simply 




244. /d. at 555-56; see also Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY 264, 270 (P. Edward ed. 1972). 
245. J. MASHAW, supra note 189, at 75-76: "[T]here is some desire that adjudicative 
personnel exercise not only a relatively controllable systematic rationality but also a relatively 
uncontrollable intuitive rationality. By intuitive rationality I mean an exercise of judgment 
that is not explained, or perhaps explainable, through a reasoned connection of value prem-
ises ·and factual findings." /d. 
246. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY 605 (D. Benner ed. 1985) (citing H. KOHUT, THE 
RESTORATION OF THE SELF ( 1977)) (defining intuition as "observation conclus;ons that occur 
very quickly of an unconscious level"). 
247. For whatever it is worth, recent social psychology research has demonstrated that a 
conscious, rational mental process does not always lead to a better decision. See generally S. 
FISKE & S. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION, 399-402 (2d ed. 1991). One recent study is partic-
ularly interesting. Wilson & Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the Quality 
of Preference & Decisions, 60 j. OF PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 181, 190 ( 1991 ). The 
researchers evaluated certain types of choices in terms of the subjects' satisfaction and found 
that "rational" decisionmaking produced inferior choices in terms of the subjective prefer-
ences of those subjects. One study, evaluating student course selection, suggested that some 
choices might be objectively inferior as well. That study found that the "rational" choices were 
inferior to the "intuitive" choices when measured against the opinions of the faculty and the 
recommendations of students who have previously taken the course. 
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selecting the drapes than setting out the characteristics of the "correct" 
drapes and then trying to pick the drapes according to that description. 
The equivalent of intuitive judgme'lt in a bureaucracy is combining vari-
ous talents and strengths in a group decisionmaking process. This blending 
of decisionmaking elements creates what might be called "decisional syner-
gism. " 248 Blending the experience and knowledge of a number of individ-
uals develops a better decision than does the sum of each individual's 
experience and expertise. 249 
One of the advantages of the administrative process is that it can create 
diverse groups of decisionmakers and bring them to bear in a variety of 
combinations, producing the synergistic effect necessary to the exercise of 
inherent discretion. Just as an individual thinking intuitively synthesizes an 
immeasurable array of data, an administrative process can bring together 
a variety of instincts, values, sensitivities, experience, and knowledge. The 
administrative process replicates that mental process by bringing together 
people who are likely to represent this complex array of factors. Just as we 
might feel more confident with an interior designer's choice of drapes, we 
look to the design of the institutional decisionmaking process to assure the 
best resolution of this type of discretion. 
There is a tendency to view the exercise of inherent discretion as the 
suspension of reasoned or considered decisionmaking. However, when 
correctly applied, it is not only a proper administrative function, it is also 
one of the strengths of the administrative process. A court that fails to allow 
for such decision making robs the administrative process of its richness and 
eliminates one of its greatest strengths. 
Finding that the decision involves such discretion, the court must take 
care. Since it cannot judge the exercise of inherent discretion according to 
any standard, it can only destroy the vitality of the exercise if it attempts 
to interfere. By its nature, only one authority can exercise such discre-
tion.2''0 If the court attempts to evaluate the administrative exercise, it will 
in essence be substituting its judgment for that of the agency intended to 
248. Koch, Confining judicial Authority Over Administrhtive Action, 49 Mo. L. REV. 183, 213 
(1984). 
249. S. BREYER, supra note 48, at 112 ("The Environmental Protection Agency, for exam-
ple, divided the problem of setting water pollution standards among several of its divisions; 
it staffed different divisions with people possessing different professional backgrounds (lawyers, 
business graduates, scientists); and it deliberately encouraged argument among them, in hope 
of giving top decision makers a more objective view."). As another observer of the admin-
istrative process expressed it: "Bureaucracy ... is not an impersonal machine but a social 
system, a way of mobilizing all aspects of the human personality in order to transform indi-
viduals into a functioning group." Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. 
L. REV. 1277, 1318 (1984). 
250. Maurice Rosenberg called this sense of discretion "primary discretion." The choice 
made by a person exercising primary discretion, he contended, is by definition the "correct" 
choice. The correctness of the choice cannot be attacked because there are no external crite-
ria on which to base such an attack. Rosenberg, supra note 231, at 639-40. 
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exercise the judgment. 251 The drafters of the F APA understood this and 
built it into the concept of unreviewability: "Matters of discretion are neces-
sarily exempted from the section, since otherwise courts would in effect 
supersede agency functioning. " 252 
The court simply cannot review the exercise of this discretion as such in 
the way it reviews all other issues. As Dworkin said of "strong" discretion: 
"An official's discretion means not that he is free to decide without recourse 
to standards of sense and fairness, but only that his decision is not controlled 
by a standard furnished by the particular authority .... " 253 Further, Jaffe 
suggests that the agency "may freely use all permissible elements, though 
an excessive emphasis on one to the exclusion of other elements may be an 
'abuse of discretion.' " 254 Evidence must be available that the agency 
included all relevant factors in the exercise. 
Most importantly, however, the court must assure that the decision 
resulted from the proper and anticipated mix of decisionmaking elements 
in order to take the fullest advantage of decisional synergism. Thus, it must 
assure that the process meaningfully incorporated all the different instincts, 
expertise, and values that the legislature intended to be brought to bear on 
the question, or that should ordinarily be brought to bear, where the legis-
lature has not demonstrated an intent. The court must also assure the integ-
rity of the process. The exercise of discretion must not be made in an 
environment of bias or political pressure. 255 Nonetheless, as to the exercise 
of inherent discretion itself, review is precluded by the nature of the deci-
sionmaking itself. 256 
251. To see the rationale behind this proposition, consider the situation in which a statute 
instructs an agency to distribute benefits by lottery. The court simply could not "review" 
the core decision without destroying the random result. Inherently unreviewable discretion 
is not the result of random choice but it is similar in that the court cannot interfere without 
destroying the intended decisionmaking process. 
252. H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 275 (1946). 
253. R. DwORKIN, supra note 195, at 33. 
254. L. JAFFE, supra note 76, at 556. 
255. 2 KOCH, supra note 2, at 153-54. 
256. Ronald Levin contended that administrative decisions are always reviewable. Levin, 
supra note 219, at 693. The misunderstanding stems from a failure to view administrative 
decisions as a bundle of issues. An issue, even a pivotal issue, in a particular decision may be 
resolved by the exercise of inherently unreviewable discretion and yet the decision may include 
resolution of other reviewable issues. Where the agency's resolution of these other issues is 
not disputable, the only controverted issue will involve inherently unreviewable discretion. 
In which case, the particular decision will be totally unreviewable but need not have been. 
Levin noted my example of the infamous FDA peanut butter rule. /d. at 694 n.22. I observed 
that the real problem with the peanut butter rule was not the procedures but the nature of 
the issue the FDA was trying to resolve through the procedures. Koch, supra note 137, at 
504-05 ( 1986). It simply could not demonstrate the correctness of the choice between 90 
percent and 87Y2 percent as the appropriate level of peanuts in peanut butter. No matter 
how much procedure it employed, ultimately the choice had to be the result of its institu-
tional process. Because of the nature of the choice, a court could not review that choice. 
True, a court could ask whether the choice was within FDA's legal authority, for example, 
but that was not controverted. In a sense then, the decision was potentially reviewable for 
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Conclusions about review of discretion 
In sum, "well-established principles of administrative law" suggest that a 
court reviewing "discretion" must take care about the meaning of the term. 
Agencies have dominance over issues of discretion, but the range of domi-
nance among the possible uses of that term is substantial. Justice Marshall 
in Curtin Matheson used the term in its general sense of broad authority and 
substantial decisionmaking freedom. The proper review of any given exer-
cise of discretion must be guided by the specific nature of the delegated 
authority and the intended decisionmaking freedom. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The "well-established principles of administrative law" for defining judi-
cial authority over administrative decisions have not kept up with the massive 
changes in administrative law over the several decades since they became 
established. The review strategy courts currently are attempting to apply 
fails so often, especially in complex review situations, that in reality judges 
find little useful guidance from the present system. This article is a call to 
reformulate the inquiry; to ask again the basic questions about the proper 
allocation of decisionmaking authority between the courts and the bureau-
cracy; to derive from such questions a more flexible and precise means of 
expressing judgments about this allocation. 
An improved review system must recognize that any given decision 
involves the resolution of a bundle of issues. Each issue in this bundle may 
require a separate review strategy. Defining review in minute detail, 
depending perhaps on differing substantive questions, is impossible and 
hence the review strategy must depend on groupings of issues. This article 
identifies issue categories and suggests the proper allocation of decision-
making authority in each category. In doing so, it relies on various judicial 
efforts to shift to an issue-driven review strategy in those cases where the 
well-established review principles are not equal to the task. Thus, legal 
authority is currently available that will support a shift to an issue-oriented 
system. By providing form and support for this emerging review system, 
this article offers a foundation for a comprehensive issue-driven review 
strategy. 
that and other issues but the pivotal issue, whether peanut butter should have 90 percent or 
87V• percent peanuts, could not be reviewed. 
